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ABSTRACT  
The objective of this thesis is to explore the relevance of the current industrial licensing and land 
allocation policy efforts to industrial SMEs needs in Egypt. The study analyzes the current 
situation of industrial licensing and land allocation frameworks and how they are facilitating the 
inclusion of SMEs in the industrial market. SMEs are core contributors to the Egyptian economy 
and hence assessing efforts undertaken to enhance their participation in the economy is of great 
importance. SMEs in Egypt, particularly in the industrial sector, are claimed to be not optimally 
performing as a result of longstanding structural and legislative and institutional barriers. The 
barriers chosen in this study are the access to land and industrial licensing barriers. The recent 
industrial policy implemented by the Ministry of Trade and Industry undertook specific legislative, 
institutional and operational reforms aiming at overcoming those barriers. Those reforms included 
changes in the investment law, enactment of a new industrial licensing law and amendments to 
laws governing the industrial land allocation system which resulted in widening the scope of 
mandates and responsibilities. The study applied qualitative research methods, particularly in-
depth interviews with policy makers, industrial SMEs investors and policy experts. The analysis 
showed that recent policy efforts are promising, however, there are some challenges that might 
hinder the optimization of the outcomes of these polices. Ambiguity of some policy measures, 
overlapping reform measures and unclear implementation tools top the concluded challenges, 
whether for policy makers, policy implementers and/ or investors. For example, the differentiation 
between the role of IDA and GAFI in land allocation and industrial licensing is unclear. Also, 
coordination within the institutional authorities working on these policies reveals the continuation 
of a fragmented institutional framework in this regard. Further institutional, legal and operational 
reforms are still needed to optimize the outcomes of the new industrial policy in Egypt in favor of 
SMEs performance.  
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Chapter One: Study Overview, Problem Statement and Research Questions 
 
1.1 Introduction: Industrial SMEs, Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness in Egypt 
 
Industrial policy continues to be the central player in the industrial transformation of most 
economies, especially transition economies. Industrial transformation usually leads to 
diversification, competitiveness, social inclusion. Industrial policy should support industrial 
transformation through removing obstacles and adjusting market failures. The modern thinking of 
industrial policy is more process oriented in which the focus is more on the interface between 
public and private actors and how this interaction is taking place, under which roles and what 
conditions (Hobohm, 2001).  
It is widely recognized that SMEs have a significant role in economic development and in 
industrial development. SMEs are considered the backbone of the private sector since they 
constitute of around 90% of enterprises across the world, furthermore, SMEs account around 80% 
of the industrial sector employment. SMEs are usually more labor intensive which indicates a 
better allocation of resources, especially in developing countries since labor is plentiful while 
capital is scarcer (UNIDO, 2011). 
Developing SME performance and integrating them into the economy has been vastly 
identified in literature as key determinants of sustainable and inclusive development. Inclusive 
development is defined by the World Bank as the development that “allows people to contribute 
to and benefit from economic growth” (WBG, 2009).   
The concept of inclusive growth is mainly concerned with the equality in opportunity; 
opportunities to social service such as health and education, and opportunities to participate in the 
growth process and benefit from it. As noted in most of inclusive growth literature, SMEs 
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empowerment should lie at the heart of any inclusive growth strategy; particularly in high 
populated developing economies with a large proportion of unskilled labor (Rauniyar &Kanbur, 
2009; Kruger, 2009) 
In 2016, Egypt launched the Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt 2030 that aims to 
jump with the Egyptian Global Competitiveness Rank to the top 30 economies by 2030. The 
economic pillar of the strategy a development strategy targets that Egypt achieves inclusive and 
sustainable growth characterized by high competitiveness and derived by knowledge and 
innovation (SDS: Egypt 2030; 2016) 
Currently, the Egypt’s rank and score in the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) have been 
deteriorating the past few years. 
Table (1): Egypt’s Rank and Score in GCI (2012-2018)  
 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 
Rank 107/144 118/148 119/144 116/140 115/138 100/137 
Score 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.9 
Source: WEF, Global Competitiveness Report: 2018, World Economic Forum.  
 Moreover, Egypt still lies in the second stage of development according to GCI 
classification, the efficiency-driven stage. According to the Global Competitiveness report, for a 
country to proceed in the efficiency driven stage, it should develop “more-efficient production 
processes” and increase product quality. Competitiveness in this stage is enhanced through many 
factors; among them come the efficient goods markets, well-functioning labor markets, developed 
financial markets, the ability to harness the benefits of existing technologies, and a large domestic 
or foreign market (Schwab, 2017). Hence, empowering SMEs is an essential tool in Egypt, not just 
to achieve inclusive and sustainable growth, but also to improve the competitiveness of the 
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Egyptian economy and relocate Egypt soon in the third stage of development according to the GCI 
classification; that is, the innovation stage.  
Despite the above stressed importance of SMEs, and despite the known contribution of the 
SMEs sector in the Egyptian GDP and employment, the sector is still underdeveloped and still 
suffers from major structural barriers. Statistics shows that the Egyptian economy includes around 
2.5 million MSMEs that employ around 70% of the total Egyptian workforce. SMEs are estimate 
to contribute with around 25-40% of the Egyptian GDP, small enterprises in particular constituted 
more than 90% of the all private sector enterprises in Egypt and employed around 63% of total 
employment (El-Hamidi &  Baslevent, 2013; European Commission, 2014). The informal sector 
constitutes around 20% of total MSMEs (Ministry of Trade and Industry, last accessed December, 
2016). Moreover, Industrial SMEs in particular account for almost 90% of total industrial firms in 
Egypt according to IDA figures (IDA, Last accessed, December, 2016). 
Figure (1): Number Industrial SMEs as a percent to total number of Industrial Firms in Egypt 
 
Source: Author Constructed based on IDA Website, last accessed December, 2016. 
 
 
 
large firms 
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1.2 Scope of the Study: Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Previous and on-going efforts are being exerted to improve the overall performance of the 
industrial sector in general and the industrial SMEs in particular to maximize outcomes from their 
activities. However, current performance indicators show that such efforts still did not transform 
into the expected success. SMEs in Egypt, particularly in the industrial sector, are claimed to be 
not optimally performing as a result of longstanding structural and policy-related barriers in 
addition to the recent cyclical problems that have exacerbated since the economic downturn that 
started after 2011 revolution. 
 IDA as well as other governmental bodies have been recently working on setting enhanced 
institutional frameworks and setting a better enabling environment for industrial SMEs to operate 
more efficiently in the economy. Recent reforms were prepared with the aim of improving the 
business environment and attracting industrial investors to contribute in the economic activity 
through overcoming the longstanding barriers and challenges. Land allocation and business 
licensing top the reform measures identified by the Egyptian government to enhance industrial 
activities and boost industrial SMEs participation. Recent steps were taken to implement these 
reforms such as widening IDA’s authorities with regards to land allocation and administration 
and formulating new regulations to improve and simplify the business licensing process, in 
addition to a set of other relevant policy measures within the newly introduced industrial policy 
framework. Nevertheless, the alignment of these reforms to SMEs needs and nature is an issue 
that needs exploration.  
In this study, the researcher focused on industrial institutional barriers and operational 
barriers that hinder SMEs from the market access; particularly two main barriers: land allocation 
and business licensing. The selection of those barriers was based on several criteria: first, these 
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barriers are the barriers that represent institutional, legislative and operational reforms; second, 
business licensing is mentioned in international surveys on Egypt as one of the top investment 
barriers, particularly for industrial SMEs. Third, land allocation is a serious problem faced in 
Egypt and it is receiving increasing attention in Egyptian policies; particularly the recent 
industrial policy that was launched in 2016 due to the deterioration of Egypt’s rank in it as will 
be discussed. 
Hence, the study aims to assess the relevance of the current industrial policy framework to 
solving industrial SMEs longstanding obstacles. More precisely, the researcher tries to explore to 
what extent is the current institutional and legal framework, including the recent reforms, 
supporting SMEs enhancement and integration into the economic activity. The research questions 
aimed to be answered in this thesis study is:  
To what extent are the current land allocation and business licensing frameworks and 
recent policy efforts in Egypt empowering SMEs and enhancing their access to the 
industrial market?  
 How does the current land allocation framework and recent policy efforts facilitate 
SMEs access to land? 
 How does the current business licensing framework and recent policy efforts facilitate 
SMEs issuance of Industrial licenses?  
 
The study focuses on two main dimensions: Land allocation and business licensing. The investigated firms 
are industrial small and medium enterprises. The researcher depends on the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
definition of SMEs in the process of selection of the sample firms.  
14 
 
The study started by an introduction and a description of the rational of the study and  then 
proceeded with reviewing literature on the industrial policy and how could it be a tool for SMEs 
development. This chapter started by defining the industrial policy and revealing its importance and 
challenges and discussed specific polices pre-requisites to empower SMEs and will focus on licensing and 
land allocation. Afterwards, a background industrial SMEs barriers and the current situation of business 
licenses and land allocation in Egypt was presented. Then chapter three is about the study conceptual 
framework and research methodology. Data analysis and discussion were presented in chapter four and 
chapter five concluded the study by discussing conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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Chapter Two: Industrial Policy as a tool for SMEs Development: Evidence from 
Literature  
2.1 Industrial Policy as a Tool for SMEs Development  
The productive capacity of an economy is highly determined by the efforts of the private sector 
and the extent of market efficiency. Putting a country’s industrial and productive capacity into the 
international context should enhance competitiveness and productivity. Enhancing private sector 
competitiveness can be perceived as a private-sector role in the first place. However the private 
sector might not be the sole actor in this process. Sometimes government intervention becomes 
necessary to adjust market distortions and provide the market with the needed support and 
incentives that should fill in the missing gaps. Also, government interventions become essential 
when competition fails to equip the market with the tools needed for innovation and accelerating 
production capacity (Haque, 2007; UNIDO, 2013).  
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the importance of industrial policy as a driver for 
investment in general and for SMEs empowerment and integration in particular. A presentation of 
the basic definitions and concepts related to industrial policy and SMEs, evidence-based arguments 
and counterarguments on the role of industrial policy in promoting and empowering SMEs will be 
demonstrated. This will be followed by a brief discussion from literature findings on the main pre-
requisites of an effective industrial policy that meets the needs of SMEs.  
2.1.1 The Definition of Industrial Policy  
Literature has defined the concept of “Industrial Policy” in different ways. Some 
definitions were just as simple as ‘promoting the industrial sector’. Other definitions included 
wider elements like improving competitiveness and innovation. Some definitions focused on the 
objective of the policy while others focused on the implementation process. Levesey (2010) 
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constructed an interesting framework and methodology for defining IP that depended on asking 
questions and providing a framework for analysis. His definition of industrial policy was bounded 
with four main questions: the scope of the policy, the degree of government intervention, the 
inclusion of SMEs and the objective of the policy. The first question is whether the policy is limited 
to manufacturing or the scope is wide to cover any industrial activity, while the second question is 
whether the government intervention will be through targeting the development of a specific sector 
of it will be just concerned with the general performance of different sectors. The third question is 
whether there is an intention to benefit Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) or the policy 
will be just directed to large and mega industries. Finally, the last question is related to objective 
of the policy; that is, whether it aims enhance productivity or just improve the enabling 
environment. Levesey (2010) argued that responses to the four questions can help designing the 
definition of the industrial policy.  
In a close manner, Lederman & Maloney (2012) definition also defines the type of 
government intervention within the framework of industrial policy and defined that policy itself 
as a set of horizontal interventions that aim to support market capabilities and the enabling 
environment. Such interventions, according to his definition, should be complemented by other 
efforts to ensure the relevance and alignment of the broad interventions to the needs and nature of 
specific sectors in the economy. 
 Other definitions focused on the drivers of the industrial policy and whether it should be demand 
driven or supply driven. Some papers defined industrial policy as a supply-driven process, where 
the government implements a policy based on the economy’s available resources during a specific 
period of time. For example, Lin (2012) defined industrial policy as “any government decision, 
regulation or law that encourages ongoing activity or investment in a particular industry”. In the 
17 
 
same manner, While Pack & Saggi (2006) defied industrial policy as “Basically any type of 
selective intervention or government policy that attempts to alter the structure of production toward 
sectors that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth than would occur in the 
absence of such intervention, i.e., in the market equilibrium".  Finally, some definitions of 
industrial policy are focused on the demand side of the policy. Haque (2007) claims that whenever 
competition alone is not supporting the productivity of the economy, the government can interfere 
in the process of industrial production to provide the necessary support to the industrial sector 
through a designed policy framework that hence would act as a demand-based response to the 
needs of the business and industrial sector.  
Levesey based on the value chain concept, builds a foundational framework for defining 
industrial policy, he assumes that this framework has to have some essential elements, based on 
these elements an effective industrial policy will be created. It is argued that an industrial policy 
has to include actions on research and development, supply management, market interaction and 
after sales services provision. Levesey had three approaches to this, the first approach provides for 
all-inclusive policy, i.e. the government decides to work on all sectors and provides additionally 
cross-sectional developments. The second approach holds for working on parts of the value chain 
process and collecting efforts in for its improvement. The third approach is much concerned with 
the horizontal development which only provides for cross-sectional development. A narrower 
approach is the fourth approach which holds for providing instruments for the development of a 
specific sector.  The final approach solely focuses of needs of different sector, in other words, 
providing tailored interventions for different sectors. 
 
18 
 
 2.1.2 The Necessity of Industrial Policy for Development: Arguments and 
Counterarguments  
 
The debate on the role of the industrial policy started in mid 1980s. Early writings viewed the 
industrial policy as a necessary tool to reach market equilibrium and provide the “missing link” 
between the private sector efforts and the market. This argument stems from the lack of confidence 
in the market forces of an economy as a sole tool for equilibrium and achieving efficiency 
(Jabsheh, 1994). Oppositely, the invisible hand advocators believed that such policies will just 
transfer government inefficiencies to the industrial sector.  
 Arguments supporting government intervention via Industrial Policy 
In this section, I present the main literature arguments advocating for industrial policy and their 
justifications. 
  Targeting Sectors and Interventions to overcome market disequilibrium. Proponents to industrial 
policy believe that industrial policy acts as a catalyst to any targeted industry. Although it cannot 
act as a solution for industrial problems, it can still provide some form of support to industries that 
might not be able to compete or cannot have equal opportunity in the industrial market. For 
example, industrial policy can support small and growing industries trying to enter the market and 
achieve competitiveness. Hence, it is argued that industrial policy will not distort the market 
mechanism, rather, it will just correct market disequilibrium. In fact, several papers addressed the 
success of industrial policy in industrial and emerging economies. For example, Jabsheh (1994) 
claimed that industrial policy had a positive effect in Korea, Japan and Hong Kong where there 
were institutions designed and mandated to implement the measures included in the policy. 
  Protection of SMEs from Fierce Competition: supporters of industrial policy agree that it provides 
protection to small industries from fierce rival competition, especially the foreign one. As Galal 
(2008) argues, industrial policies in the form of subsidies, cheap credit or tariffs reductions 
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decrease production costs for such industries and hence increases their profits and widen their 
shares in the markets gradually. Incentives granted through industrial policy motivates 
entrepreneurs especially small ones to invest in knowledge acquisition through introducing 
innovative products and techniques to the market and train their workers.  
Industrial policy Spillovers on the sector. According to Galal (2008), Pack & Saggie (2006) and 
Taha (2007), industrial policy can positively affect industrial sector performance through three 
main channels knowledge spillovers and dynamic scale economies;, targeting special industries 
development will create knowledge acquisition and accordingly knowledge spillovers will benefit 
the whole economy. 
Industrial Policy can create information externalities. Government intervention in the industrial 
sector could help in providing entrepreneurs with the needed information about the cost structure 
of a certain industry and could also help countries to produce more than its production pool. If the 
government performs this role efficiently, this shall provide investors with the information needed 
to compete in areas out of their comparative advantage and even enhance competition on an 
international level (Galal ,2008;  Pack & Saggie , 2006; Taha 2007). 
Industrial Policy promotes linkages and supply chains.  Given that some industries are already 
linked with other industries through a supply chain, government coordination policies can 
provide a sort of connection, facilitate inter-linkages between industries and provide a benefit 
from economies of scale, and supply the connected industries with the needed infrastructure for 
the whole supply chain and not in a fragmented manner.  This will definitely minimize costs 
and increase productivity of the whole chain (Galal, 2008; Pack & Saggie, 2006; Taha, 2007).  
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Arguments opposing government intervention via Industrial Policy 
On the other side, opponents of setting an industrial policy framework in a country usually rest 
their arguments on their belief that there is no clear relationship between industrial policy and the 
industrial performance. They rather believe in a strong role of the government in distorting the 
market mechanism and carrying over government inefficiencies to the private market.  In this case, 
industrial policy can be just indicative, rather than forcing a hand into the development and 
innovation process or even the business marketing. 
Industrial Policy might distort market equilibrium. Jabsheh (1994) argues that industrial policy 
can distort domestic equilibrium since it doesn’t treat all industries in an equal manner. This is 
mainly through the taxation and subsidies and other investment mechanisms that are designed 
differently for different industrial sectors. Moreover, industrial policy can even distort 
international trade since government protection measures can create an isolate the domestic market 
and in this case countries will lose the comparative advantages and other potential trade benefits .   
Government will never have sufficient information about the market. Opponents even criticized 
the assumption that the government has the best pool of information and can identify coordination 
opportunities and design support schemes to enhance productivity and competitiveness in the 
economy. The assumption is based on the belief that the government can identify the strategic and 
neediest sectors, potential winners, geographical location investment maps and latest technologies. 
However, Opponents argue that, in an efficient market economy, the private sector usually have 
better information about access to information and more efficient market studies. This is not to 
mention the challenges related to government bureaucracy, politically-driven decisions, rent-
seeking and principal-agent problems and other government failures (Galal, 2008; Jabsheh, 1994; 
Pack & Saggie, 2006; Taha, 2007).  
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Rodrick (2014) argues that the main challenge for the government in the industrial policy process 
is the institutional arrangements needed to produce a well-designed policy and to implement it. 
The first challenge with the institutional arrangements is that although the government primarily 
aims to overcome the problem of information externalities, it does not always have sufficient 
information about the nature of the market failures and their locations. This emphasizes the need 
of engaging private sector and other stakeholders in the policy-design process.  
Government Bureaucracy – and sometimes corruption - might hinder the efficient implementation 
of the designed policy.  Depending on government bureaucrats in creating the policy could open a 
room for rent-seeking behaviors and corruption. In this case, incentives developed to encourage 
investments can simply turn into a rent transfer mechanism to corrupted businessmen and 
bureaucrats (Galal, 2008).  
Uncertainty of industrial policy outcomes.  Industrial policy is also criticized for its uncertain 
outcomes. Opponents claim that the implementation of the policy can impel mistakes that can 
affect the economic performance not just in specific industries but also on the macro level. 
However, huge mistakes could be minimized if the policy was designed in close coordination with 
the private and related stakeholders to guarantee successful implementation. Rodrik (2004) notes: 
“The right model for industrial policy is not that of an autonomous government applying Pigouvian 
taxes or subsidies [i.e. lump sum taxes or subsidies], but of strategic collaboration between the 
private sector and the government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant obstacles 
to restructuring lie and what type of interventions are most likely to remove them” (Rodrik, 2004). 
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2.1.3 The Pre-requisites of an effective Industrial policy  
 
In the industrial policy design process, the government should work on providing an 
adequate institutional arrangement for developing a sound policy and overcoming challenges. 
Reviewed literature mentioned specific factors as pre-requisites for an effective industrial policy.  
First, the Establishment of an Effective Institutional Framework that Guarantees the Successful 
Implementation of the Policy 
Given that industrial policy is considered a set of governmental decisions and actions, the 
institutional setting that guarantees the effective implementation of this policy is not of less 
importance. Literature stresses on the importance of providing an institutional framework that 
guarantees a smooth implementation of the policy.  
These institutions should acquire all the required powers, the needed information, the adequate 
human resources, the efficient understanding and implementation tools that empowers them to 
implement the required programs and developments (Kollavalli et. Al, 2011; Rodrick, 2004). 
Coordination between the industrial policy institution and the implementing institutional bodies is 
a necessity to ensure the effective implementation of the policy. For example, a “development 
agency” might be the agency implementing the designed industrial policy, however, the tax 
authority is an essential institution for implementation. Accordingly, the coherence in the 
bureaucratic space is an important factor in the design of the policy and even in the choice of 
activities (Loewe, 2013; UNIDO, 2013). Loewe (2013) further affirms the need of establishing 
coordination councils as part of the institutional architecture to make sure that the information 
exchange process is taking place and that social learning is happening. These councils could be 
public-private bodies that include relevant groups. They have to seek collecting information on 
new investment ideas, market problems, facilitate coordination between different institutions, push 
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for stronger legislative framework for the policy implementations and lobby for all needed 
changes. Such institutions could be created either at national and sub-national levels or even on 
sectoral levels (Loewe, 2013).  
Second, a strong industrial policy should include conditional incentives and support to growing 
and new industries.  
It is believed that the more the government is willing to support new innovative activities and 
latest technologies, the more the policy is expected to succeed (UNIDO, 2011). In this regard, 
Galal and El-Megharbel (2006) argue that supporting entrepreneurs should be based on their 
measurable outcomes rather than plans and strategies. For example, subsidies should be tied with 
exports, productivity, employment indicators…. etc. Nevertheless, setting time frames for 
achieving targets is very important. Putting a time limit to the support granted to investors would 
help them realize that the given support will end at some point in time and that they will have to 
find a way in which they can internally sustain their project. Focusing the support on activities 
rather than sectors can better help the economic performance (Galal and El-Megharbel (2006). 
Third, An efficient industrial policy should balance between the optimum forms of intervention: 
horizontal versus vertical interventions 
 
An effective Industrial policy should balance between vertical and horizontal interventions.  It 
is argued that it is better for the state to horizontally support the industries by creating a good 
working environment rather than encouraging specific sectors that can even the choice of these 
sectors can be problematic (Loewe, 2013). Oppositely, Rogersson, (2001) argues that Promoting 
industrial SMEs could take place by focusing the efforts on certain industries that show a 
competitive advantage and an opportunity for growth. As discussed earlier this goes under the 
vertical industrial policies which focus the efforts on specific manufacturing sector in which it 
provides certain tailored incentives for investor in these sectors. These sectors are often selected 
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according to the sector’s performance as well as their economic contribution, socially, 
economically, and environmentally. Consequently, governments in this case have to make rigorous 
exercise in “picking winners kind of policy” (Rogersson, 2001).  
Third, An effective industrial policy should set proper selection criteria for the supported 
projects 
Industrial policies need to include proper selection criteria of the projects that will receive 
support from the government. For example, linkages of these activities to other industries, abilities 
to provide technological spillover effects, sustainability and ability of re-invention and sustaining 
their presence in the market Rodrick (2004).  
 
Fourth, Building Strong Transparency and Accountability Frameworks and an Effective 
Monitoring and Evaluation System 
 
Like any policy or strategy, building effective institutional transparency and accountability 
framework is an essential pre-requisite for a good policy implementation institutional framework. 
Industrial policy design and stages should be publicly disclosed and easily accessible for the public 
and investors. Continuous monitoring will protect the implementing institutions against 
undertaking rent-seeking behavior. Providing a strong system for monitoring the behavior of the 
policy makers and implementers is a key driver of the successful implementation of the policy. 
Public monitoring is essential to prevent any corruptive or unjustified preferential treatments 
(Rodrick, 2004; Loewe, 2013; UNIDO, 2013).   
Loewe also stresses on the importance of providing regulatory impact assessment of each policy 
instrument used and that there should be an effective monitoring plan. Also the UNIDO IDR 
(2013) stresses on the importance of selecting indicators that specifically measure the impact of 
the policy not just its outcome. It is also argued that there should be an assessment to the 
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unintended impact that that is expected to show after the implementation of the policy that might 
show in factors beyond the industrial output, for example technology advancements and innovation 
levels. 
 
Fifth, Strong Political Leadership, Commitment and Lobbying Efforts 
Rodrick (2004) mentions that political leadership tops the essential success factors for the 
success and sustainability of any industrial policy. To create an effective industrial policy there 
should be a strong political commitment from the leadership. The presence of strong leadership 
enhances communication and awareness and facilitates coordination with other bureaucratic 
institutions. Loewe (2013) agreed with Rodrick (2014) on the importance of the presence of a 
legitimate political leadership that backs this strategy up and provide the proper advocacy and 
support. He additionally mentions the importance of lobbying of pressure groups for creating a 
sound industrial policy that overcomes information and coordination externalities. The  
 
Sixth, An Efficient Industrial policy require a healthy business environment 
In this regard, reviewed literature highlight the importance the investment and industrial 
climates as success factors of the designed industrial policy. Doing business factors such  as well-
educated and trained labor force, well acquainted to innovation; adequate infrastructure and proper 
transportation system; the existence of a proper financial system that facilitate the access to capital 
for industrial projects; the elimination of any unnecessary bureaucratic regulations; maintaining 
an economic and  political stability; liberal trade and finally and transparent taxing system for the 
industrial sector (Galal and El-Megharbel, 2006; Rodrick,2014) 
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Seventh, Alignment of the Industrial Policy with the National Frameworks and other 
interrelated policies 
 
Designing an effective and implementable industrial policy cannot be done without aligning 
this design with other related policies. Other policies could support or conflict with the designed 
industrial policy designed which could lead to future problems in implementation. Among these 
policies is the competition policy. The competition policy always holds for preventing monopolies 
and guarding the market from dominant mergers and acquisitions. It guards the market form any 
abuse that could weaken competition. The competition policy may conflict with the industrial 
policy since the later could hold for providing advantages for certain sectors or activities. Unlike 
the competition policies which usually look for the proper governance of the market (UNIDO, 
2013). 
The second policy that is recommended to be considered is the trade policy. The trade policy of 
any country directly reflects in its international competition. Globalization and the international 
integration put pressures on the internal market of any country and made competition fiercer. 
Pressures form the international communities and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
forced countries to lower trade barriers like tariffs, non-tariff barriers and quotas. This adversely 
affected the local economy of most developing countries as high quality international products 
dominate the market and consequently local producers tend to specialize in low value added 
products like agricultural commodities or low value added manufacturing products that require 
low wages (Haque, 2007; UNIDO, 2013). 
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2.2 Specific Industrial Policy Pre-requisites to Empower SMEs and Enhance their 
Participation in the Industrial Sector  
   
 
Although the contribution of SMEs in the economic activity differs from a country to another, 
it is widely evident that SMEs always have a significant share of the economic activity a driver for 
inclusive growth and development. SMEs activities increase workers' productivity and improve the 
overall productivity of an economy (Ayyagari, 2014). Although large firms might have high 
productivity levels, small firms have the highest rates of sales growth, job creation and employment 
growth. As per the Tewari et. al (2013) SMEs that employ less than 250 full-time employees have 
a great share from the total number of companies in any economy and usually provide a significant 
share of total jobs and the  value added in any economy. More specifically, Hobohm, (2001) argues 
that industrial SMEs can employ 40 to 80 % of the employment of the SMEs employment of an 
economy. 
This is mainly because SMEs are usually more labor-intensive and therefore they create a more 
equitable distribution of income and significant reduction in poverty levels. They also allow for 
better inclusion of women into the economic activity and reduce the gender wage gap. Additionally, 
being more labor-intensive allows for better resource allocation in developing economies with high 
working population and limited capital resources. SMEs also help in developing decentralized 
productive capacities since they have a wider geographical coverage and can absorb the productive 
resources at all levels (Hobohm, 2001).  
Despite the importance of SMEs in developing countries, they still suffer from several common 
identified barriers. A number of scholars have identified the access to finance as the major barrier 
to SMEs growth and development, especially in the industrial sector. The access to finance is 
always a main barrier to investors that doesn’t allow them to establish or even grow. In developing 
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countries, there is usually a problem of the limitation of credit instrument and credit guarantees. 
This hinders investors’ attempts to grow and cope with technological changes all-over the world. It 
was also pointed out that the lack of finance appears highly in transition economies where financial 
markets are poorly developed and loans are usually limited to state enterprises or large firms ( 
Stevenson, 2010; Santiago, 2016; Lin, 2012; Wang, 2012).  
Access to non-financial inputs is also considered a constraint to SMEs business development 
and growth. Taxes and tax administration are also considered barriers for SMEs entrance and 
formalization. However, other non-financial barriers like access to land, scarcity of land, poor 
access to information on land availability and land management are usually considered serious 
barriers to SMEs empowerment and participation in the economy.  Licensing and business 
environment regulations are also considered major barriers to SME growth especially in developing 
countries. Issues like the management skills and training of entrepreneurs and their capacity is also 
can also back set the performance of SMEs (Sidik, 2012 & Wang 2012, 2016).  
As a response to SMEs problems, many countries created governmental bodies to focus their 
work on SMEs and drafted plans for their developments. Other agencies draft plans for industrial 
development and therefore, different plans and policies might not be harmonized. In this case, 
knowledge is harder to information and coordination externalities increases demotivating investors. 
The poor alignment of different policies is a drawback in any economy that usually negatively 
affects SMEs (Altenburg, 2011).   
In addition to the previously mentioned role of industrial policies in enhancing development, 
industrial policy is a fundamental tool in promoting SMEs especially in developing countries. 
Supporting the establishment of SMEs and strategies to enhance competitiveness is a starting point. 
Supporting the entrepreneurship policy and creating an attractive environment for investors is a 
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crucial aspect for development. However, depending on an entrepreneurship policy might not be 
enough. Barriers to starting up business might need actions far beyond an entrepreneur policy. As 
mentioned earlier, business registrations procedures, industrial licenses and regulations and 
business development services constitute real impediments to SMEs investments in developing 
countries.  
 In many countries, the enormous procedures that the investor has to undertake in order to 
establish a business and especially and industrial business are beyond the capabilities and capacities 
of many investors, particularly small and medium sized projects. This barrier usually hinders 
investors from formally registration and is a main reason for the creation and persistence of the 
informal activities Bureaucratic, non-transparent and in many cases corrupted licensing process is 
clearly evident in many developing economies with imperfect institutional frameworks.  Time and 
efforts – that can take months and years sometimes – to issue a business license is an enough reason 
to crowd out private investment; predominantly SMEs (Stevenson, 2010; Santiago, 2016; WBG, 
2012). 
In this regard, governments are encouraged to implement policies that can facilitate business 
entry and operations. Simplifying procedures, providing information and overcome bureaucracy 
and overlapped duties is also crucial for business facilitation. One step to do this is to set an 
industrial policy framework that consolidates efforts, facilitates communication with investors, 
simplifies laws, regulations and procedures in a way that promotes industrial investment in general 
and SMEs in particular (Stevenson, 2010; Santiago, 2016; Lin, 2012). 
In transition and developing economies1, trade liberalization and private-sector led markets 
have widened the scope for industrial firms’ growth at many levels. This openness might negatively 
                                                          
1  Transition economies are economies changing their economic systems from socialist, government- dominant 
economic systems to open markets, capitalist, private-sector dominated economies (IMF, 2014).  
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impact industrial SMEs in developing countries since one of its main components is the removal of 
the protectionist trade policies and the direct exposure of domestic investment to fierce international 
competition and international standards added to the local competition by the large firms (Hobohm, 
2001). 
 Governments in this case have to work on aligning the industrial policy instruments with the 
macroeconomic framework and policies and link the industrial policy to the general business 
environment locally and internationally. For example it is important to align the taxing policy with 
the priorities of the country, taxing policy should address SMEs problems. Investors should not be 
hindered to formally register their firms due to the harsh taxing policies. Additionally, aligning the 
industrial policy efforts with the current trade and competition policies is need. There should be an 
encouragement to SMEs to compete globally. Monopoly practices should be controlled and the 
government has to create a trade policy that best fits the needs of SMEs. Such policies could include 
reducing import tariffs on factors of production and opening global markets for small investors 
through networking them with global values chain (Stevenson, 2010; WBG, 2014) .  
Another solution is the clustering policy, clusters are defined as the “geographic concentrations 
of interconnected companies, specialized, service providers, and associated institutions in a 
particular field that are present in a nation or region” (Chaplin, 2010).  Industrial clustering can be 
a key tool for industrial development. The methodology of cluster development is based on 
providing a full value-chain of a certain industry. It targets creating and/or importing all essential 
players working on the cluster to a same geographical location. The government should have an 
essential role in the development of such clusters ensure their efficient operation (Chaplin, 2010).  
Government policies could range from providing infrastructure to targeting industrial 
concentration through creating industrial parks. This requires financial funding to support utilities 
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like electricity and water. In the clustering process, the government usually provides the needed 
sources of technology and also provides the needed knowledge of the market and the possible 
innovation opportunities. Additionally, for the clusters growth policy, there has to be a strategy for 
linking SMEs across borders, as discussed above, the export strategy should be aligned with the 
needs of these firms and serve the purpose of the cluster (Akerlof, 1970; Gereffi & Stark, 2011).  
Clustering policy is adopted in order to overcome some barriers that are faced by SMEs. It is 
considered a solution for the fragmentation problems. Evidence shows that clusters enhance firms' 
efficiency and achieve economies of scale. Additionally, clusters make it easy for businesses to 
start-up; in an effectively managed cluster, suppliers are available for these stat-ups. In developing 
countries, clusters are mostly labor intensive and they work with work with a small-scale 
technology. Therefore, an industrial clustering policy entails social inclusion and inclusive growth. 
Cluster also solve the problem of the high transaction costs between suppliers, manufacturers and 
traders, this is attributed to many reasons. Among these reasons are the imperfect contracts 
enforcement, reachability and lack of information (Akerlof, 1970; Gereffi & Stark, 2011). 
In addition the general pre-requisites discussed earlier to design and implement an efficient 
industrial policy; specific issues appear to be of serious importance for industrial SMEs 
empowerment. In addition to the other famous barrier, problems related to access to land, issuing 
licenses, and business sophistication are always mentioned among the top barriers to SMEs 
participation in the industrial sector (Schwab, 2017; World Bank, 2016). Policies related to 
improving land allocation and administration, easing business licensing, and enhancing clustering 
and value chains are crucial for promoting SMEs and maximizing their outcomes in developing 
economies.  Since these policies are the focus of this study; a deeper overview on their importance 
and characteristics will be presented in the remainder of this section.   
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2.2.1 Land Allocation Policy and SMEs Empowerment 
Setting for an efficient land market is another policy instrument that an industrial policy should 
address. Land markets in mismanagement practiced by government in assigning properties. This is 
clearly evident in rigid contracting and ineffective procedures in property registration. Poor land 
administration consequently result in creating barriers to SMEs operations, especially in urban 
areas. Efforts in the area of land allocation and land ownership are crucial in order to solve the 
problem of the wasted and misused land (Kolavalli et al., 2011).  
 
2.2.2 Industrial licensing to Promote Industrial SMEs formalization and participation in 
the economy 
 
Licensing is considered a main barrier to the SMEs developing counties are impeding 
investors’ efforts especially SMEs to grow and participate in the economy. Evidence shows that 
SMEs suffer from inadequate access to land and this goes back to the  
particularly in Egypt, it is the second rated barrier after the access to finance (WBG, 2017). 
The OECD (2006) defines businesses licensing as “the practice of requiring prior approval of a 
government authority for the establishment or conduct of a business”. Approval is based on the 
provision of specific validated or certified information usually in written form.” The WBG 
identifies business licenses as a commonly used form of regulation that controls the entry to the 
market.  
Licensing usually imposes a range of rights, obligations and conditions on the investor and 
puts the investment within formal framework. Business licenses do not include activities like the 
general business registration. Business registration usually includes taxation, name of the company 
and statistical purposes. In some cases, permits are part of licenses and sometimes they are not. 
Permits are usually a provision of regulatory approval for a defined activity. Licensing is close to 
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procedures like business registration, inspections and permits, nevertheless it is different from 
them. In a good licensing system, it is a mean to fulfill legitimate and regulatory procedures and a 
tool to implement regulatory purposes for the public benefit. This protection could include 
environmental protection, health and safety, preserving scarce resources and national security. 
Licenses is also a away to regulate the entry to markets and issue the commencement of activities.  
Business licensing are offered by the national government or can be delegated to authorities 
like business associations, chambers of commerce and other non-governmental agencies (IFC, 
2006; OECD, 2006 & WBG, 2010).  
Wang (2012) argues that criteria and policies that guide the activities and sectors that have to 
be subject to licensing widely differ form a country to another. There are no defined list of activities 
that is widely known should be subject to licensing procedures. However, there are justified and 
unjustified licenses. Justified licenses are licenses that set operating conditions in which businesses 
are expected to comply with certain requirements, standards and conditions. There are many 
sectors that needs to be regulated in order to protect environment and people. However, not all 
licenses fulfills this purposes. This leads to the occurrence of unjustified licenses. As per Wang 
(2012), unjustified license is the license that tends to regulate things like goods and services 
certification, notifications of regulatory compliance and process inspections (WBG, 2010). 
Unjustified licenses can results due to many issues: first, the government might apply them 
as a data collection tool about businesses for planning purposes. However, other tools such as 
marketing surveys, tax reports and business registration reports could be better alternatives to 
unjustified licensing. Also, they might issued as quasi-fiscal functions; to raise revenues for a 
certain agency. On the other hand, some countries carry on some procedural facilitations for 
specific sectors or SMEs or for innovation reasons (Wang, 2012).  
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2.3 Industrial SMEs in Egypt: Background and Statistics 
As mentioned earlier in this study, the SMEs sector is a major contributor to the Egyptian 
economy. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the SMEs sector in Egypt suffers from the general 
barriers to investment in addition to the industrial SMEs-specific barriers in particular with a focus 
on land allocation and industrial licensing. Data on barriers are extracted from international 
surveys and assessments on investment climate and doing business: The Enterprise Survey issued 
by the World Bank, The Investment Climate Assessment issued by the World Bank, The Global 
Competitiveness Index issued by the World Economic Forum, and the SMEs Policy Index issued 
by OECD. This in addition to some brief information from literature on the two main institutional 
barriers: Land allocation and Licensing. It is worth noting that literature and empirical work on 
this topic in the Egyptian case is still very limited.  
2.3.1 Barriers to SMEs investment in Egypt  
In addition to the general known barriers to investment in Egypt, the common recognized 
structural barriers to SMEs activities in particular are mainly access to finance, business licensing, 
corruption, tax administration, land allocation and administration. This is in addition to cyclical 
barriers such as political instability and the repercussions of the recent economic downturns. In 
this section, a snapshot will be presented on the land allocation and business licensing problems 
in Egypt as mentioned in investment surveys and relevant literature. This background will support 
the qualitative analysis that will be undergone in the next chapter on the current situation and the 
remaining steps with regards to these two barriers. 
2.3.2 Business Licensing Problem in Egypt 
According to the Enterprise survey issued by the WBG (2016), obtaining business licensing 
ranks the fourth top obstacle facing business in Egypt and the third top obstacle facing medium 
enterprises in the manufacturing sector in Egypt after the political instability and access to finance. 
36 
 
Days needed to obtain construction and operating license in Egypt are significantly higher than 
MENA region and world countries (WBG, 2016).  
Table (2): Barriers to Investment in Egypt by size of Firm - Manufacturing Sector 
(2016) 
Biggest Obstacle  
 Egypt 
2016  
Small 
firms  
Medium 
firms  
Large 
firms  
Middle 
East & 
North 
Africa  
Lower 
Middle 
Income  
Access to 
finance  
13.2  13.8  10.6  16.6  9.6  13.5  
Access to land  1.1  1.5  0.3  0.7  2.7  3.9  
Business 
licenses and 
permits  
8.2  8.0  8.9  7.3  3.8  2.7  
Corruption  6.6  7.2  3.8  10.9  7.1  9.1  
Courts  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.3  1.0  0.9  
Crime, theft 
and disorder  
2.9  4.0  1.0  0.3  1.8  4.2  
Customs and 
trade 
regulations  
4.6  3.5  7.4  3.9  3.6  3.8  
Electricity  5.9  6.7  4.7  3.3  12.8  10.5  
Inadequately 
educated 
workforce  
4.4  3.5  6.4  5.0  8.0  5.7  
Labor 
regulations  
4.1  2.4  7.2  7.7  2.7  2.4  
Political 
instability  
33.8  33.0  36.6  30.7  27.0  13.8  
Practices of the 
informal sector  
3.1  3.7  1.8  2.6  7.0  14.0  
Tax 
administration  
1.9  1.9  2.3  0.6  1.6  3.8  
Tax rates  8.7  8.9  7.8  10.0  9.6  9.2  
Transportation  1.3  1.6  0.9  0.2  1.7  2.6  
Source: WBG, 2016. Enterprise Surveys:  Egypt Country Profile. WBG. 
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As further illustrated in the table (2), the number of days required to obtain construction and 
operating permits in Egypt is inversely related to the firm size; that is, smaller firms take more 
time in obtaining licenses compared to larger firms. 
 
Table (3):  Days needed to Obtain Licenses and Construction Permits in Industrial Firms 
in Egypt (2016) 
 Egypt  Small firms Medium 
firms  
Large 
firms  
Middle East 
and North 
Africa  
All 
countri
es 
Days to 
obtain a 
constructio
n-related 
permit  
103.3 104.1 38.4 139.0 99.1 47.5 
Days to 
obtain an 
operating 
license  
31.9 34.2 33.7 18.9 38.6 22.5 
Source: WBG, 2016. Enterprise Surveys:  Egypt Country Profile. The World Bank Group. 
A recent Investment Climate Assessment undergone by the World Bank argued that the 
licensing problem has recently shown a slight improvement as indicated in table (3). Days to get 
permits and operating licenses have decreased significantly WBG (2017).  
Table (4): days to receive permits and operating Licenses: 2013-2016 
Permitting 
    
Operating License 
    
        
2013 2016 2013 2016 
0-7 days 9% 32% 0-7 days 4% 41% 
8-15 days 9% 1% 8-15 days 6% 21% 
16-30 days 30% 10% 16-30 days 25% 14% 
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31-90 days 35% 4% 31-90 days 18% 10% 
More than 90 
days 13% 23% More than 90 days 13% 7% 
Still waiting or 
rejected 5% 29% Still waiting or rejected 35% 7% 
Source: WBG, Investment Climate Assessment, 2017.  The World Bank Group. 
Kaganova (2017) affirms this problem by noting that the difficulties in obtaining permits 
and licenses for  construction and operation on industrial land “continues to hinder attractiveness 
of land in many IZs and to contribute to the cost of doing business for potential tenants and Small-
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in particular” (Kaganova, 2017:5). The paper suggests to construct a 
one-stop-shop similar to that in GAFI to issue permits and licenses for industrial projects in IDA-
controlled industrial zones and projects.  
Kaganova, 2017 also raises the private sector claim issuing permits for industrial land takes 
months, and, “even after licenses are obtained, at least 50% of an enterprise’s management time is 
still spent on dealing with government” (Kaganova, 2017: 5). The time and effort exerted in this 
process – particularly for SMEs- is a core determinant for the choices of these activities to stay in 
the informal sector.  
 
2.3.3 Land Allocation Problem in Egypt 
With regards to land allocation issues, it is counted among the top barriers that hinder SMEs 
operations in Egypt. According to the Investment Climate Assessment, although the time needed 
to request land allocation with the relevant permits and licenses have reduced, however, access to 
land in Egypt is considered a generally deteriorating issue and its problems are becoming acute for 
smaller firms, and for firms in Upper Egypt (WBG, 2017). The reasons behind this deterioration 
need to be investigated and analyzed.  
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 Figure (2): Access to Land percentage citing as a Major constraint in Egypt (2013-2016)   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WBG, 2017. Investment climate assessment in Egypt: 2017, The World Bank Group 
 
As shown in figure two, the problem is magnified in the case of small and medium enterprises. 
Smaller and medium firms face bigger problems with regards to land access compared to larger 
firms as illustrated in the below figure.   
Figure (3): Access to Land as a Barrier to investment – by Firm Size (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WBG, 2017. Investment climate assessment in Egypt: 2017, The World Bank 
Group 
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Compared to other countries, Egypt still ranked as no. 122 among 190 countries by the 
composite “doing business” index (WBG, 2016). According to Kaganova (2017), "more than 25% 
of private domestic companies surveyed in 2009 identified access to land as a “major or severe” 
factor, which places Egypt as no. 38 among 46 countries studied". 
 Literature analyzing the reasons behind the mal performing land allocation system is 
limited. However, of the main works done in this regard is what Kaganova (2017) mentioned as 
the land allocation and administration system in Egypt suffers from several problems related to 
legal and institutional framework and conflicts between implementing agencies as well as poor 
information provided to investors. 
Loewe (2013), argues that helping small and medium-size enterprises to access land tops 
the necessary measures perceived as priorities in the new Egyptian industrial policy.  
IDA is currently the institution entitled to provide land and infrastructure to enterprises 
industrial zones industrial zones including the craft zones. Accordingly, in the chapter six, the 
researcher will present the results of a qualitative analysis on the recent steps taken with regards 
to land allocation problem in Egypt, particularly for SMEs. 
In summary, the literature reviewed discussed the industrial policy issues form different 
perspectives. This study presented different definitions of industrial policy, these definitions 
ranged in scope and purpose, each had specific focus. Then arguments pro and against industrial 
policy were presented. The study identified the commonly discussed arguments that support the 
enactment of industrial policy and the arguments that claim that its negative impact is high and 
that the intervention of the government in the industrial sector is not preferable. The study also 
addressed factors required or the “pre-requisites” of an effective industrial policy. These factors 
included factors that can be generalized over any policy like transparency, accountability and 
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political leadership and other factors that are specifically needed in for the industrial policy like 
the choice of the intervention; whether vertical or horizontal interventions, also alignment of 
industrial policy with other policies like trade policy and competition policy.  
The thesis study afterwards focused on industrial SMEs and their significance in the 
industrial sector. Barriers to SMEs were also addressed, the study reviewed the financial and non-
financial barriers that face SMEs as per the reviewed literature, these barriers included access to 
finance, access to land and regulatory bureaucracy. Attendant to that, the study mentioned the most 
important solutions for SMEs barriers discussed.  Then the study focused on two main solutions 
to SMEs access to market, first, is the land allocation and second is the industrial licensing as a 
way to facilitate the access of SMEs to the market. The last section in literature gave a background 
on the industrial SMEs problems in Egypt with a special focus on the land allocation and licensing 
problems. Form the literature reviewed, it is inferred that there is little research about the land 
allocation and industrial licensing problems from the investor’s perspective in a qualitative matter 
that discussed the effect of the legislative and institutional frameworks of these two issues and how 
are they affecting the investor.  
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Chapter Three: Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology 
3.1  Conceptual Framework  
The study intends to highlight the relevance of the current industrial development policies 
implemented to the needs of industrial SMEs in Egypt. Recent policies and newly enacted laws 
are assessed with regards to their contribution to solving SMEs problems and overcoming 
obstacles of formalization and market entry.  Based on earlier review of literature, this chapter 
highlights the main concepts that are interlinked with the industrial policy and process issues in 
Egypt. The analysis in this study is limited to two main industrial policy issues: 1) land allocation 
and 2) business licensing. The rationale behind choosing these two reforms  is that they are directly 
connected to SMEs industrial market access and that both reforms received reforms in terms of 
legislative, institutional and operational perspectives.  
3.1.1 The definition of Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy is widely defined in literature. Some scholars viewed it is as an instrument 
that governments make use of to create a competitive industrial environment and bring about 
structural change. Others define it as a dynamic process that has to be regularly monitored and 
renewed. This study adopted the definition of Levesy (2010) who defined the industrial policy as 
a list of requirements that are used to shape the policy analysis. Levesy (2010) views industrial 
policy as an instrument that has to be evaluated and analyzed and additionally, the appropriateness 
of the instruments used within industrial policy must be understood and evaluated. Levesy 
describes four main elements that his study considers as determinants to effectively identify and 
evaluate the appropriateness of an industrial policy. The four elements are best described in four 
questions as follows:  
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• Is the policy limited to production and/or manufacturing or does it apply to the entire 
industrial sector?  
• Are the policy instruments used crosscutting sectors (horizontal policies) or are they 
specified to certain sectors (vertical policies)?  
• Are the policy instruments used target the growth of SMEs or are they designed to fit large 
companies? 
• Are the policy instruments being adopted influencing the economic structure of the 
economy or are they more specified to industrial development? Are they just enabling 
conditions for better competitive industrial sector or are they designed specifically for 
industrial structural change?  
The above definition is the best fit for the study since it frames industrial policy as a collection of 
instruments that contribute to the industrial development and consequently affect the performance 
of the economy as well as enforcing structural change. Moreover, Levey’s definition stresses on 
the aspects of the policy that concern the inclusion of SMEs, and the chosen sectors. The focus of 
this study is the relation of the industrial policy instruments to SMEs and the obstacles such 
enterprises face within the Egyptian context.  
Production is only one part of the manufacturing process and so identifying whether the 
industrial policy targets the entire manufacturing process or just the production phase is important. 
Some industrial policies are just concerned with production activities while others target the entire 
manufacturing sector including activities such as R&D and the design of the products, the products 
themselves and also service provision (Levey, 2010). This study will focus on the entire 
manufacturing sector since it allows for analyzing the potential linkages between various policy 
instruments that are all crucially needed manufacturing process. Additionally, the Egyptian 
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industrial strategy adopted by the Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry extends to nearly the 
entire manufacturing process and is concerned with the linkages that exist between the different 
components of the manufacturing process. It is also concerned with the alignment of the 
manufacturing policy instruments to other policy instruments, for example, trade policy and 
competition policy.  
3.1.2  SMEs and SMEs Empowerment Definition  
SME definition and scope differs from one country to another and even differs within 
countries and international agencies. The variations in definitions are qualitative as well as 
quantitative. Some qualitative definitions include factors like the human dimension and the social 
aspect, also idea of the relation between the entrepreneur and the management of the firm and to 
what extent is the management of the firm personalized. SMEs can also qualitatively be defined 
by the extent of the flatness of the organizational chart. On the other hand, other scholars and 
institutions define SMEs through measurable elements like total revenues of the firm, the 
employed capital, the sales turnover and the value of the contracts undertaken.  
In the Egyptian context, SMEs have been more commonly defined through quantitative 
means, as such, the study will adopt a quantitative approach in defining the SMEs. This is also in 
line with the latest definition of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the policies of which are the 
subject of this thesis.  
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The decree issued by the Minister of Trade and Industry in accordance with Law No. 
15 of 2017 on facilitating the procedures for granting licenses to industrial 
establishments defines industrial SMEs as establishments that carry out industrial 
activities under the following conditions. 
Table (5): Definition of SMEs according to Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Size Establishment Age Annual Turnover/Paid Capital 
Small 
Already Existing less than EGP1 million and not more than EGP 50 million 
Newly Established 
not be less than EGP 50,000 and doesn’t exceed EGP 5 
million 
Medium 
Already Existing 
not less than EGP 50 million and not more than EGP200 
million 
Newly Established the capital should exceed EGP 15 million 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, last accessed November, 2017 
SMESs empowerment in this study is defined as the process by which SMEs investors that seek 
entrepreneurship become aware of the power and the  dynamics of the work and can easily define 
market contexts that enable them to establish firms without coordination and information 
externalities (UNIDO, 2016). SMEs Empowerment is a wide issue; however, this study focuses 
on the empowerment in terms of facilitating the access to the market.  
3.1.3 Egypt Industrial Development Policy Framework  
Policies implemented by the Egyptian Government include vertical instruments that are 
directed towards certain sectors and horizontal ones that are cross-cutting which are more 
concerned with enhancing the business environment for industrial firms. Within the horizontal 
policies there are instruments that are directly related to the industrial development and other 
policies that relate to trade, competition and access to finance. The study will analyze the industrial 
development policy efforts recently implemented by IDA under the Egyptian Ministry of Trade 
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and Industry that are most concerned with SME development. These efforts include reforms in the 
legislative and regulatory framework for licensing and land allocation.  
The scope of this study will cover the analysis of two main elements that the Egyptian 
government is currently undertaking with the aim of stimulating the industrial sector. The chosen 
reforms are industrial licensing process and land allocation and management.  
These reforms address the facilitation of starting up industrial business. These elements are 
chosen based on the analysis of the major obstacles faced by SMEs in Egypt Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, last accessed, November 2017). The strategy document formed by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry mentioned that these are priority areas receiving reforms since they facilitate 
the access of SMEs to the market.    
The latest Enterprise survey report issued by the WBG (2016) demonstrates that the second 
highest obstacle facing manufacturing SMEs after the access to finance is the problem of business 
licensing. While access to finance is a generally identified SME barrier, licensing is a specifically 
recognized industrial SME barrier.  
And for the land allocation, although there are statistical data that showed an improvement 
in the time spent on the land allocation process, there is a significant deterioration in the access to 
land as a barrier by around 70% (WBG, 2017). Therefore, Ministry of Trade and Industry 
conducted recent reforms targeting land allocation that are another concern for the analysis of this 
study.  
The reforms conducted by IDA in industrial licensing and land allocation are the main 
concerns of this study, analysis will take place form a legislative, institutional, and operational 
perspectives. These reforms will not only tackle industrial business entry barriers, they will also 
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have a great influence on solving the informality problem since entry barriers is one of the main 
reasons behind the growth of the informal economy in Egypt.   
3.1.4The Framework of Business Licensing in Egypt  
  
As illustrated in the statistical analysis, licensing is one of the top barriers to industrial 
SMEs. Also, the first reform area reflecting considerable changes recently is industrial licensing 
facilitation. The study will analyze the effects of the Egyptian Government’s recent efforts in 
reducing the time and effort required to obtain an industrial license; mainly reform of the 
concerned laws and regulations that attempt to make industrial investment more attractive. The 
potential effects of such reforms on SMEs empowerment will be discussed. 
The researcher used the OECD definition of business licensing since it is the closest 
definition to the context of the industrial licenses in Egypt. OECD (2006) defines business 
licensing as “the practice of requiring prior approval of a government authority for the 
establishment or conduct of a business”. Business licensing reforms are essential to SMEs since 
they help the government regulate the market and protect the public against any resource 
exploitation and hazardous effects. Also, facilitating such licenses should encourage the informal 
economy in SMEs to formally register. This study assessed the latest reforms carried out by the 
Egyptian government in two main steps: First, the study carried out a quick review of the legal and 
institutional frameworks that governed the industrial licensing process in Egypt before and after 
the reform. Second, the study undertook a quick assessment of the licensing reform in accordance 
with the Wang (2012) framework developed for business licensing analysis since it provides 
details for the essential requirements that need to be considered in reforming the licensing system 
which is presented in the discussion.  
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According to Wang (2012), the government has to undertake a set of four main reforms to 
build and efficient licensing system. First it needs to assess the licensing geographical coverage 
all over the country. If all industrial businesses are required to take a license, this means that there 
might be some unjustified licenses that have to be eliminated.  
The second aspect is identifying and mapping all licenses that relate to the industrial sector, 
the target is to identify overlapping licenses to be able to eliminate any unnecessary licenses that 
could add burdens on firms, especially SMEs nationally and locally. Third, it is important that the 
government conduct a streamlining of all procedures and remove any unnecessary steps and cancel 
any unnecessary legislations. A new license process should come out with the elimination of the 
unjustified licenses procedures that will reduce the time and effort exerted by the investors. 
Wang (2012) also recommends the assessment of the functioning of the reform and making 
sure it is really benefiting the public.  
Finally, the functioning of the new reform should ensure the effective functioning of the 
new licensing policy. This will show the extent and efficiency to which the new law is enforced 
and how this is impacting SME investors. The below figure summarizes Wang (2012) framework 
of an efficient licensing system.  
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Figure (4): Framework of reforming the licensing system 
 
Source: Author Constructed, Based on Wang (2012) 
 
 
3.1.5 The Framework of Land Allocation in Egypt 
The industrial sector performance is directly related to the efficiency of management and 
allocation of industrial land, and this is the second reform area addressed by this study. In the 
Egyptian context, land problems usually originate from the management of state owned lands. The 
Egyptian land management policies and practices are outdated and inefficient and result in higher 
obstacles for firms and especially SMEs (Kaganova, 2015).   
This study aims to review the recent land allocation reforms undertaken to facilitate access to land 
for industrial sector in general and for SMEs in particular. The study undertook the analysis by 
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applying the Kaganova (2015) framework for industrial land reform for the case of Egypt. This 
framework is specifically chosen since it is tailored to the Egyptian context and it addresses SMEs 
problems. The land mentioned in this study is defined as the land used for industrial activities that 
require facilities and infrastructure development, these lands range from industrial zones2 and craft 
zones. 
 Kaganova’s framework has five main dimensions that constitute an effective and efficient 
land management scheme. First, it is essential to have a national framework for a policy or a 
strategy aiming at utilizing the land available in a way that can be attractive to investors and 
especially to SMEs in order to enhance economic growth, sustainable development, equal access 
and social inclusion.  
Second, sufficient effectiveness, accountability and transparency in the land allocation 
process that allows an efficient tracking of land allocation and management and simplified access 
to land for investors. An inventory about available land held by government authorities has to be 
available for the public.  
Third, a clear classification between the local and central government and a special 
framework for local land management. 
 Fourth, overcoming the overlapping responsibilities and the spread of functions of land 
management over the different institutions. Fifth is that the laws and regulations undertaken has to 
make the explicit recognition that the government land belongs to the people of the country, and 
that the government is just a guardian and manager.  This study will apply this framework to the 
                                                          
2 Industrial zone is a piece of territory with a continuous border that is zoned for predominantly industrial uses 
(Kaganova, 2015) 
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extent that it fits with the current land allocation reforms undertaken within the Egyptian context. 
The criteria of the analysis will be as follows: a) the availability of a national framework (legal 
and institutional) that facilitates SMEs access to land; b) The provision of a strategy for utilizing 
the land and making it attractive to SMEs; c) Is the efficiency, accountability and transparency of 
the land allocation process taking into account the facilitation between the local and central 
government? 
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Figure (5): Conceptual Map 
 
Source: Author Constructed  
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The figure above shows the framework of the study, the researcher will present two main 
reforms that are considered industrial policy tools and analyze the case before and after these two 
reforms. These two reforms are the industrial licensing and the land allocation. For the land 
allocation, the study will focus on the new roles and responsibilities of IDA and the operational 
barriers of the land allocation process. And for licensing, the focus on the latest law issued for 
reforming the licensing system. These two reforms are explored form a legal, institutional and 
operational perspectives. And analyzed from the perspective of SMEs, how has these reforms 
affected SMEs inclusion and access to market, as a part of the Egypt’s vision 2030. Each reform 
is analyzed based on the criteria discussed above. The next section will present the methodology 
and methods used in this research.
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3.2 Research Methodology 
3.2.1 Qualitative research design    
This study aims at understanding the latest reforms undertaken by the Egyptian 
Government and how these reforms were relevant to the SMEs problems especially with regards 
to licensing and land allocation. The study uses an exploratory qualitative approach to undertake 
this analysis, this is the most suitable research design since it is enables the researcher to deeply 
understand and investigate the complicated and interlinked framework studied.  
The research questions are based on the “how” nature which eventually requires 
exploratory tools that provides for best understanding of issues like institutional, legislative and 
procedural frameworks. Qualitative exploration is the only method that can offer this type of 
exploration. This design is the best design that enables the researcher to explore the industrial 
licensing and land allocation reforms since the data that will be collected is basically data from 
interviews. This qualitative research reveals the contexts and the settings of the data which enables 
the researcher to deeply explore and understand the studied topic (Marshall & Rossman, 2006) 
3.2.2 Overall research strategy  
This reteach study is based on an in-depth interview strategy. "In-depth interview strategy 
stipulates a primary method for gathering data" (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). For triangulation 
purposes, the study interviewed 1) policy makers and implementers; 2) SMEs investors and 3) 
experts in the field that were included in the sample in order to give some unbiased opinions. 
Additionally, the study will verify this by undertaking some desk review based on secondary data.   
The in-depth interviews took place one-on-one bases. The data collection process took 
nearly one month. The duration of the interviews ranged between 15- 30 minutes each. Questions 
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were semi-structured, there was a list of questions that was targeted for each type of interviewees 
and this list was subject to changes according to the context of the interview, probing questions 
were usually added to the interview questions. Interviews with policy makers and implementers 
were done at their offices, while of the interviews with investors were made at their place and some 
were conducted over the phone. And for the policy experts, interviews were conducted over the 
phone since they were hard to reach.  
This study used the non-probability two types of sampling techniques; the first is the 
purposive sampling technique in order to identify the policy makers and policy experts. And for 
investors, the study used the snowballing technique in order to reach the largest sample of 
investors. The typologies used allow to put specific criteria for the participants’ selection in order 
to support the purpose of the study (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). Representation was also 
considered, for example interviewed investors were chosen on the national levels and local levels.  
Twenty interviews were conducted for the purpose of this study. Interviewees were chosen 
purposively based on and their relevance for the study. Based on these criteria, the following are 
the 20 interviewees:  
Policy implementers: 
• Land Allocation Specialist, IDA 
• Industrial Licensing leader, IDA 
• Management Representative, Licensing Department, IDA  
• IDA Representative, Qena 
Experts: 
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• Legal Expert, ERRADA 
• Licensing Expert, IDA 
• Research Analyst, ERRADA 
Investors: all investor were SMEs investors as per the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
framework identified in the conceptual framework, choice of governorates was based on the 
regional classification of the Ministry of Trade and Industry that is based on economic diversity 
(six governorates), economic complexity (four governorates) and governorates requiring 
comprehensive development (14 governorates). Cairo and Alexandria are governorates that are 
characterized by economic diversity, Sohag and Qena are governorates that require comprehensive 
development (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2016). The researcher was not able to reach 
investors from the second classification that are characterized by the economic complexities. 
Interviewed investors were as follows: 
• Five investors form Cairo  
• Four investor’s from Sohag 
• Three investors from Qena  
• Two investors from Alexandria 
3.2.3 Data collection 
The study heavily depended on primary data given the limited evidence in the literature. 
Nevertheless, the relevant secondary data needed for triangulation purposes were reviewed. To 
operationalize the primary data collection, the study conducted semi-structured interviews with 
each participant. Interviews were transcribed right after interviews in an accurate manner. All 
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interviews were conducted by the researcher on bilingual bases in English and Arabic. Secondary 
data was collected through desk research from laws, websites and international reports. 
3.2.4 Data analysis 
The twenty interviews were transcribed separately. The analysis of the transcriptions of the 
interviews were done traditionally with no use of software. The analysis followed the thematic 
categories of the conceptual framework. The coding exercise was based on pattern and descriptive 
coding styles that allowed the analysis to be based in the patterns in the data.  
3.2.5 Ethical considerations 
The primary data collection used in this study involved human subject matters and 
consequently it involved a number of ethical considerations. Participants in this research study 
adjusted their times and offered the researcher the time and the knowledge to answer the study 
questions and therefore this is highly acknowledged and they were offered the needed information 
on the study and a quick structure of the interview.  
Participants' anonymity and confidentiality were totally guaranteed so not to harm them. 
Informed consent for the participation in the study was collected from participants orally in order 
to guarantee voluntary participation. The Institutional Review Board approved the proposal of the 
study on November 19, 2017 prior to the data collection process. All relevant ethical 
considerations were highly considered and approved prior to the data collection.        
3.2.6 Limitations and delimitations of the study 
The first limitation to the study from a methodological perspective is the sample size. The 
relatively small number of the sample is an issue especially in the topics with regard to business 
licensing and land allocation. Additionally, there was no sample for investors that tried the new 
licensing system and therefore the investor was forced to get data about this issue through 
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interviewing policy experts. Getting interviews with policy implementers that are not confident in 
the purpose of the study and not so open is considered a limitation of the study. Even getting the 
data from investors who somehow mistrusted the researcher was also another limitation to the 
study. In the next chapter, data analysis and a discussion of the data will be presented.
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Chapter Four: A Qualitative analysis of the Current Egyptian Industrial 
Policy and its Role in Empowering SMEs 
 
4.1 Land Allocation Problem in Egypt-Data Analysis and Findings  
In this section, the researcher analyzed the latest reforms and their relevance to industrial SMEs in 
Egypt based on the criteria addressed in the conceptual framework.  The analysis is based on three 
main dimensions: 1) National framework (legal and institutional); 2) The Land Utilization Strategy 
and 3) Land Allocation Process Effectiveness, Transparency and Accountability. In the three 
dimensions, the study presented the results of the desk review together with the data analysis of 
the selected sample of interviews as previously highlighted in the conceptual framework and 
methodology. This will be followed by a discussion on the main findings of the desk review and 
the data analysis. 
4.1.1 National Legal and Institutional Framework of Land Allocation 
 This section analyzed the current legal and institutional framework that governs land 
allocation and the recent developments with regards to the needs of the small and medium 
industrial investors.   
Primarily, it is worth noting that currently Ministry of Trade and Industry is undertaking legal and 
institutional reforms that aim at creating a better land allocation framework and helps in making 
industrial land more attractive and better utilized. In order to well understand the current reforms, 
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the researcher presented a desk review of the most important laws and decrees that govern land 
allocation in Egypt, followed by the data analysis of the interviewed sample3. 
A) The main laws and decrees the govern land allocation in Egypt- Desk Review 
The state land of Egypt is governed by nearly 31 laws and around 172 decrees. This is in 
addition to around 13 laws that manage the industrial lands. Indeed, some of those laws have direct 
effects on the industrial land as presented below. 
Law No. 21 of 1958 on Regulating and Encouraging Industry: This law entails that the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry is the official body responsible for industrial regulations, approving 
industrial licenses and specifications. This law allows the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 
cooperation with the governorates to lease or own sate-owned lands for industrial purposes.  
Presidential Decree No. 350 of 2005 on Establishing the Industrial Development Authority. 
This decree was concerned with the establishment of the IDA and gave it the authority to 
implement several duties mentioned under law 21 (as part of the Ministry of Trade and Industry) 
including industrial land allocation that is under the National Center for determining the uses of 
Lands and approving any industrial project outside of the developed industrial zones.  
Law No. 59 of 1979 on New Urban Communities defining NUCA responsibilities. The law 
states that the NUCA is the sole entity responsible for any developments in the new urban 
communities4. Under this law, NUCA is entitled the responsibility to determine the size and 
location of the required lands in the emerging urban communities. These lands are allocated to 
                                                          
3 There are much more laws and regulations that govern the industrial land allocation, however these specific laws 
were done after a consultation of a legal consultant at the ERRADA.  
 
4 The emerging urban communities are defined in the law as any new collective community that aims at creating an 
urban center. This urban center could include industrial, agricultural , commercial and other activities.  
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NUCA by a Prime Ministerial decree, free of charge5. If a project was previously implemented in 
the allocated land or a close area, it can be offered for sale at a reasonable price. NUCA has the 
right to make contracts with private developers to develop such lands. NUCA has the right to lease, 
sell and offer usufruct rights for the land. NUCA’s role ends when the land is fully developed, 
whereby the management of the land is then transferred to the competent local authority.  
NUCA-IDA Protocol: In 2014 NUCA jointly signed a protocol with IDA that entitled IDA to 
allocate lands of industrial zones within the new urban communities. However, NUCA still 
possesses the ownership of this land (NUCA, last accessed December 2016). Based on this 
agreement, IDA had a delegated right to sign agreements with private developers to develop 
industrial zones in terms of establishing the needed infrastructure to enable and facilitate the 
implementation of   industrial projects. Hence, infrastructure agreements of this type are signed 
between the developer and the investor under approval from NUCA and IDA.  
Law No.  7 of 1991 on State Privately Owned Lands. This law regulates the state privately 
owned land6. Although the law is mainly concerned with agriculture land, it allows local 
authorities to allocate this land to other sector projects including industrial projects. Article 5 states 
that this land could be used for other activities (including industrial projects) after the provision of 
a presidency decree.   
Law No. 143 of 1981 on the Desert Land. This law and its executive regulations were are 
considered an important milestone in the process of institutionalizing the use and allocation of 
desert land in Egypt. The executive regulations of the law included an article stating that land 
                                                          
5Examples of new urban communities are:    6th of October - 10th of Ramadan - 15 May - New Damietta - New 
Borg El Arab - New Salihia - Sadat - Tourist Villages- New Cairo - Sheikh Zayed - Badr - Obour - New Beni Suef - 
New Minya - New Nubaria - Shorouk - North Gulf of Suez- New Assiut - New Tiba - New Sohag - Aswan New - 
New Qena - New Fayoum – New Akhmeem and  El Sheikh Zayed. 
6State Private owned land is the land that the government can dispose and the State Public land is land allocated  
to public utilities (Article 32, Egyptian constitution).  
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allocated for industrial projects will fall under the authority of GARADP. GARADP is responsible 
for selecting and approving land areas suitable for implementing industrial projects.  
Law No. 5 of 1996 Regulating Free Disposal of State Owned Desert Lands for Investment 
Projects. This law allows local authorities to freely dispose “desert land” for investment projects. 
The terms and conditions of the disposition are determined by a presidential decree. The ownership 
transfer of this land to investors is done after the completion of the project. Additionally, the annex 
of the law indicates that the prime minister has the right to declare certain areas as the industrial 
lands.  
Law No. 43 of 1979 on Local Administration. This law manages the local administration in 
Egypt, article 14 states that the governor and the local administration have the right to dispose or 
allocate public land areas for investment projects within the governorate’s domain and two 
kilometers range, including industrial projects. Land areas could be sold, leased or rented.  
Law No. 119 of 2008 on Building and Urban Planning (the Unified Building Law). The law 
was issued to unify the construction regulations. Under this law came the establishment of the 
SCUPD which has representatives from NUCA and IDA. Part of SCUPD responsibilities is 
approving general policies for urban development. The law stated that, for industrial land 
allocation, the governor should plan the use of the governorate land based on the requirements of 
SCUPD policy and IDA should approve these plans which are confirmed to be owned by the 
governorate.  
Law No. 83 of 2002 on Special Economic Zones. The law announced the establishment of 
Special Economic Zones. Projects established in these zones are subject to specific incentives 
compared to other land areas in Egypt. A special Economic Zone Authority was also established 
to manage the operation of these zones.  Once a special economic zone is established, the 
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ownership of the land is transferred to the special economic zone authority. The law allows the 
Special Economic Zones Authority to allocate the land and provide the right to usufruct, and this 
is the only type of land allocation in these areas.  
Law no. 72 of  2017, the amendment of law no. 8 of 1997 on Investment Incentives and 
Guarantees. This law has major implications on the investment and the industrial lands. The law 
identifies the GAFI as the agent between the investor and other authorities in the country. It is 
responsible for providing land, permits and licenses.  Other agencies are obliged to coordinate with 
GAFI in this context. This law also allowed the creation of some investment territories for certain 
types of investments, some of them are industrial for example, mining, gas and software 
production. The law allows the inclusion of other sectors after the approval of the cabinet of 
Ministries. Land allocation under these territories are not subject to the normal tender procedures 
and the normal competition. Rather, allocation depends on lottery without financial or technical 
comparisons.  
Law no. 83 of  2016 which is an amendment of law 7 of 1999 for state privately owned land. 
This is considered the latest law issued that had a direct implication on land the industrial use. The 
first article of the new amended law entitles IDA the right to utilize, manage and dispose all 
industrial land in Egypt.  However, the first article also confirms that the President has to issue a 
decree indicating the industrial land that will be under the authority of the IDA. Article 7 of this 
law confirms that the returns of the land utilization, management and disposition will be designated 
to IDA and are considered to be a source of income to this Agency. It is worth noting that this law 
mentioned that IDA will only manage the land, it does not own it.  
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B) The Institutional Framework governing land allocation in Egypt –Data Analysis 
Parallel to the above desk review of the legal the framework, interviews with selected 
investors and government representatives were undertaken to understand more clearly the 
institutional framework governing the industrial land. In this section, the researcher presents the 
data analysis based on the mentioned interviews.  
The fragmentation of land under different authorities. As previously indicated, industrial 
land in Egypt is divided under four main authorities: Ministry of Trade and Industry, NUCA, local 
Governorates and GAFI. In this regard, the interviewee indicated:   
“The industrial land in Egypt is now clearly classified and at least we can know 
which land is belongs to which authority. We can say now that industrial lands belong to 
four main authorities Ministry of Trade and Industry, NUCA, GAFI and of course the 
governorates. Some other lands that might not be explicitly industrial land but can 
accommodate industrial projects are also under the governorates or maybe other 
ministries but this is very rare.” (Land Allocation Specialist, IDA, December 2016)” 
Industrial land in Egypt is scattered which might create a barrier that faces the investor in 
the allocation process. The investor does not have accurate information on the correct entity he 
should pursue in order to apply for a project in a specific location. However, one positive thing 
here is that IDA is the authority in charge of land allocation since 2006. Nevertheless, while the 
investor receives land allocation approvals from IDA, the ownership transfer process of the land 
and the financial payments are still done with the agency that has the sovereignty over the land.  
Lack of institutional coordination. Lack of coordination between the institutional authority 
that allocates the land area and the institutional authority that has sovereignty over the land creates 
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inconsistencies, double efforts and overlapping responsibilities. As mentioned by Kaganova 
(2015), the unification of these two roles usually facilitates the process of the land allocation as it 
unifies the fragmented efforts and give clearer holistic vision for both the investor and the policy 
makers. Investors were asked about the difference between the land allocation process after being 
under the IDA, an investor who allocated a land for a medium-size factory in 1991 indicated the 
following: 
“I allocated the land to my factory in 1999, these were the good days, we used to 
go directly to the Governorate and if the land is available they give it to us, it used to take 
time, I took three years to allocate my land, however, the process was known and the same 
authority who was allocating is the same authority who is transferring the ownership of 
the land who is the same authority you pay for, now authorities can be mixed up. A friend 
of mine allocated the land from IDA for a marble manufacturing activity and when he went 
to receive the land, he found it in an area that is allocated for wood industries”(Investor 
8, November, 2016).  
As shown, the investor perceives IDA taking over land allocation as a negative issue that 
further complicated the process. Although he praised the simplification of time needed to get the 
land allocated, he believes that still responsibilities are poorly-coordinated among different 
authorities which in many cases can lead to technical problems and add further time and effort 
barriers in the process of land allocation.   
The above problem was affirmed by another investor: 
“I applied for the land two years ago, I took time since it goes to Cairo, the 
engineer that studies the feasibility study is in Cairo and we do not easily receive 
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responses , another problem is that IDA can allocates, but when you come to receive the 
land it is always confusing and sometimes the Industrial Zones managers that are under 
the local authority play the broker role, where they tell you this land is not specialized for 
you industry and so on, they may want a kind of a bribe to facilitate the process.” 
(Investor 5, November, 2016) 
The investor affirms the problem of weak institutional coordination and the 
misinformation. He highlights the problem of time consumed in the process of coordinating 
between the local authority and IDA. He even mentioned another barrier which is corruption in 
the process of providing the needed information for the investors, where sometimes officials might 
ask for illegitimate benefits in exchange for information. 
Broadening the scope of IDA powers and authorities to simplify the land allocation 
process: The Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry supported the ratification of a law that 
unifies land allocation and the land management under one authority which is the IDA7. According 
to the amendments on law number 7 of year 1999, the scope of authorities and powers of IDA 
should be broadened beyond land allocation8.  The amendments moved the sovereignty of 
industrial land under IDA authority. IDA shall be the sole authority responsible for supervision 
and jurisdiction over all industrial lands. According the law, IDA enjoys all the rights and powers 
granted to similar institutions such as the New Urban Communities Authority. As discussed with 
an interviewed IDA employee he states:  
                                                          
7 As part of the Ministry’s strategic objective to increase the industrial land by at least 60 million square meters in 
order to enhance the Egyptian export growth (Industrial and Development Strategy, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2016). 
8 An institutional authority that has sovereignty over the land is the authority that has the control over the land, it has 
the information about this land, has responsibility of utilizing, finding resources for maintaining any developments on 
this land and finally can dispose this land. On the other hand, the institutional authority that allocates the land is the 
authority that can just approve a certain project (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Last accessed December, 2016)  
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“IDA will own, allocate and transmit the land. The ISA will take care of its financial 
duties, build its infrastructure” (Land Allocation Specialist, IDA, December , 2016) 
This amendment grants IDA the responsibility of setting the general policy framework and 
plans in charge of the development of the industrial zones and identifying the lands allocated for 
industrial purposes. This is in addition to setting the operational framework governing the 
exploitation and development of the land areas within industrial zones. This is expected to 
positively contribute to the supply of land and facilitate the system of land allocation (Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, accessed November 15, 2017). Those legally-entitled rights should further 
enable IDA to create a national framework for utilizing the industrial land in Egypt which is the 
first priority in solving the access to land problem (Kagonova, 2015). It is expected that if this law 
is fully implemented it will solve the problems mentioned by investors as barriers resulting from 
poor coordination and fragmentation of institutional authorities.  
It is worth noting that this law is not yet fully implemented since it is awaiting the 
presidential decree with the specifications of the industrial land area and the approval of 
transferring the supervision of this land under IDA authority. As elaborated by an interviewed land 
allocation specialist when asked about why this the investors still need to go to the governorates 
and to agencies like NUCA:  
“The amendment of law 83 doesn’t at all mean that the land is currently under the 
authority of the IDA, however, there should be a decree with that. There is a committee 
that has been established to work on this, this committee is under the responsibility of The 
National Center for Planning State Land Uses and has representatives form IDA, this 
committee has to work on creating an inventory for the industrial land in Egypt. Let me tell 
68 
 
you, for this to come true, there should be a very strong coordination and acceptance 
between all the state authorities” (Land Allocation Specialist, IDA, December, 2016).  
The Egyptian government is currently trying to undertake strong measures in order to unify 
the sovereignty over the industrial land in order to avoid land fragmentation and facilitate the 
allocation process to investors, especially SMEs that usually have difficulties in reaching 
information due to land fragmentation allover the authorities in Egypt. However, this is not an easy 
task and it will not get implemented by just amending the law.  
The transfer of land from the owning authorities in the state requires tremendous efforts in 
collecting all the information on the industrial land available and classifying it. This also requires 
political acceptance from the owning authorities since they will be sacrificing one of their sources 
of revenue. IDA will need facilitate direct coordination with agencies like NUCA, GARAPAD, 
and local authorities. As per the different laws like law 59 of 1979, law no. 143 of 1981 and law 
no. 43 of 1979, IDA should be exerting tremendous efforts in collecting the information on these 
lands and planning for its management. Additionally, transferring the land will create a huge 
responsibility on IDA since it will be responsible for managing this land and developing it to 
accommodate industrial projects’ needs and requirements.  
IDA current capacities and capabilities as opposed to investor needs and requirements. 
Transferring the sovereignty to IDA and widening its scope of responsibilities with regards to land 
management and utilization is a policy that needs consideration. The fact that the IDA is 
empowered with the needed capabilities and capacities that can support the implementation of this 
new system is still questionable. Interviews with investors showed that IDA is not yet fully capable 
of managing the land all across the country; particularly given the fact that it is located in Cairo 
and does not have enough geographical coverage outside the Egyptian capital. It can be inferred 
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that investors, especially SMEs, are already suffering from the low capabilities and the low 
responsiveness of IDA employees on both the national and the local levels. An investor that 
submitted a land allocation request in 2015was interviewed about IDA’s capabilities and responses 
to his demands and problems faced, he responded:   
“If I have a problem, who do I go back to? I think it is only the media. Previously, 
this process was decentralized, yes it entailed a lot of corruption,it used to take like 2 
months, now it will the like 20 months. I submitted my documents to the IDA branch at 
Suhag in December 2015, when I came back to ask them, they told me call 140 the phone 
directory and get IDA’s Cairo branch number. I did and called them, they never reply” 
(Suhag Investor 3, December, 2016) 
The investor shows a concrete example of the argument that the problem of long, time and 
resources consuming process of land allocation isn’t solved till today. Although the new law 
granted IDA the responsibility of land allocation that is still under the sovereignty of the 
governorate, it seems that the coordination between the governorate and IDA is still weak. 
Additionally, given the fact that IDA is an Agency that just has around 1500 employees, it might 
not be able to meet the increased responsibilities and the accumulating needs of the investors in 
general and SMEs in particular.  
The Political Leadership and Institutional Cooperation to Support IDA : The success of 
this reform will depend in the first place on the political will and cooperation between different 
authorities to facilitate the transfer of the land. Additionally, after the enactment of the presidential 
decree IDA shall have much stronger power over land areas which should facilitate the transfer 
process. However, the capacity of IDA employees and their readiness to offer a responsive service 
is still subject to doubt. Also, the capability of IDA to develop land infrastructure and provide the 
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adequate services that could make these lands attractive for investors is an issue that needs more 
research. As noted by an interviewed land allocation specialist, authorities that will transfer the 
land might not support IDA in its new mission: 
“We have to face the fact that after the transfer of the land, other authorities like 
NUCA will totally pull out their hands, why will they invest in infrastructure and 
developments of lands that will not yield any revenue to them, we have to be ready for this” 
(Land Allocation Specialist, IDA, December 2016).  
Preparing for this shift will require huge efforts by IDA in case the transferring agencies 
weren’t cooperative, particularly given that they will not have any incentive for doing this. IDA 
will need to plan, manage, and utilize the land all on its own.  
4.1.2 Land allocation process- Operational Barriers  
As mentioned earlier, IDA has taken over the authority of allocating industrial land for 
investors across Egypt since 2005. In order to explore the effectiveness and transparency in the 
allocation process by IDA we will give a quick glimpse on the process of the allocation. 
There are two ways to allocate industrial land, as noted by an interviewed land allocation 
specialist at IDA:  
“There are two ways to allocate industrial land in Egypt. At IDA we have two types 
of land allocation: The first is the general allocation. This tender is held for the areas that 
are of low demand. The second type is the specific allocation, in which IDA has to advertise 
for the land, this is done for the lands that are attractive. The tender process happens within 
IDA, however, the transfer of the land might not be at IDA since IDA still does not have 
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the sovereignty over the industrial land” (Land Allocation Specialist, IDA, December, 
2016) 
The first type of tendering - the general tendering- is done in land areas that are less 
attractive and thus less demandable. In this case, the investor has to visit IDA and check out the 
available land and begin the allocation process. The second type of land allocation is the specific 
tendering type. The land allocated under this type is usually highly competitive and the most 
attractive. IDA in this type of tendering works according to a prioritization process. They develop 
a Terms of Reference (ToRs) that ensures competitiveness. Attractive land areas are defined by 
IDA and bids are then opened according to certain conditions. These bids are usually advertised 
in publicly and in newsstudys.  
In order to investigate the process of land allocation in terms of effectiveness and 
transparency, interviewed investors were asked about several issues related to the dynamics of the 
land allocation process.  In this section, several issues pointed out by the interviewed investors 
will be furtherly presented.  
IDA High Centralization, low coordination with local authorities: Primarily, one of the 
interviewed investors revealed problems related to the coordination between IDA and the land 
retaining authority. He noted:  
“IDA allocates land but it has no information at all, all information is under the 
localities, the localities should coordinate with IDA for the benefit of the investor, IDA has no 
background on the history of these lands, and its suitability to the projects designed for it” 
(Investor 4, December, 2016). 
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The investor explained that IDA might not have the full information on the land and the 
optimum utilization ways. This is resulting from the fact that IDA does not have the sufficient 
geographical coverage, which can be considered a serious limitation and can lead to misguiding 
the process of land allocation. The investor recommends that IDA should establish a strong 
coordination and access to information mechanism with local authorities that own the land to 
facilitate the process of land allocation. 
Another investor underscored the same idea of the poor coordination between IDA and 
local authorities: 
“The biggest obstacle we face in land allocation is the bad coordination between 
IDA and governorates, the authority that transfers the land is the governorate while IDA 
allocates. Some blocks at Nagaa Hamadi were allocated and these blocks have no 
electricity or any facilities. For my experience I applied for an extension to my factory in 
2016 and they allocated a land to me, when I went to receive the land form the governorate, 
I discovered that this land is already allocated previously to another investor. I call them 
and send them emails and no one replies, I was urged to travel to Cairo to see a solution, 
however, it has not been solved” (Investor 7, November, 2016).  
The investor here is highlighting the coordination problem, where IDA is not in well 
synchronization with the governorate that has the authority over the land. This clearly spots the 
light on the coordination problem between the central government and the local authorities. 
Investors have to seek the central government in order to solve any problem. Kaganova (2015) 
mentioned the importance of coordination between central and local governments as a determinant 
of an effective land allocation process and a strong access to land framework.  
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Interviews also commented on the land allocation transparency process, in interviewee 
when asked about his land allocation process stated the following: 
“I applied for land for three times, the first time, it was cancelled as they were 
issuing the latest investment law, the second time, the tender was announced in a public 
newsstudy, after three months I asked at and I found it was rejected. I didn’t know what 
was the problem, I had to ask a relative of mine who knows the dynamics there, he told me 
put some money under the table to someone form IDA in order to make the feasibility study 
for you and move it internally.  I talked to two guys there and they were really helpful both 
of them took EGP8000, they made the feasibility study for me and they got me the 
acceptance.”(Investor 2, November, 2016) 
The investor here highlights the problem of the lack of transparency in the land allocation 
process. He claims that he tried allocating land three times. First time he knew the reason of the 
cancellation which was a high-level decision as there was a law that was being put in draft. The 
second time, he was rejected and he did not know why. Someone recommended that he gives a 
bribe to an IDA employee to make the feasibility study of the land for him and processes it and 
after he did this, his request was accepted. This shows that IDA might have some loopholes in the 
land allocation system that might include some rent-seeking behaviors an in transparency. 
The Incomplete operational framework of IDA. Despite the important IDA mandate that 
entitles IDA the full authority on all industrial land across the country, IDA has not yet received 
the sovereignty on all industrial land. In this regard, IDA established a Special Land Management 
Unit for managing industrial zones to ensure the maintenance of the infrastructure, provide 
services to the existing factories and provide training for the land users based on the needs of each 
region. This unit should also conduct a strategy for managing the industrial land. This is in an 
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attempt to overcome the present problems and inefficiencies in the industrial zones management. 
Moreover, new efforts and steps have taken place in an attempt to facilitate IDA's role in land 
allocation and licensing. Moreover, the strategy preparation and implementation still suffer from 
several challenges as identified by the interviewed sample.  
Insufficient Human Resources in the land Management  Unit: An IDA interviewed 
specialist affirmed that IDA land strategy unit is mandated to collect the needed data about 
available lands from all authorities and governorates and use it as input for the land management 
strategy.  
“IDA land strategy unit made a survey and knew the resources of each governorate 
and is designing the strategy based on that. This survey team consists of 3 people who 
conduct this research by themselves.” (Land Allocation Specialist, IDA, December 2016)  
The land strategy team in charge of setting the land management unit is working on 
preparing the needed infrastructure and conducting the needed developments in the lands. 
However, the human resource capacity provided for this task is far below the needed capacity that 
should undergo the reqyired studies and analysis.  As discussed by Kollavalli et. al (2011), the 
preparation for managing industrial zones is a huge mission that needs capacities and capabilities.  
4.1.3 Land Utilization Strategy – IDA Initiative for SMEs 
In an attempt to increase the demand on industrial land in specific promising areas and at the 
same time enhance SMEs activities in this field, IDA announced an important initiative called:  
“Your licensed Factory is Ready: SME initiative". This initiative is implemented in Badr, El-Sadat, 
Port-Said, Merghem and in Upper Egypt. The initiative is considered a step towards SMEs 
integration in the economy to utilize the industrial land in Egypt. However, there are some 
mentioned shortcomings that are worth investigation and highlighting. In this section, the 
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advantages as well as the short-comings of the initiative will be presented from both perspectives: 
The IDA perspective and the investor perspective.  
The IDA Initiative: "Your Licensed Factory is Ready: SMEs Initiative" – IDA Perspective 
The initiative is mainly a set of tenders that seek the establishment of around 500 small and 
medium-sized factories in the form of SMEs complexes9. The basic idea of the initiative is that if 
the investor won the tendering process, he/she receives a ready-built factory with complete 
facilities and all the required licenses (construction permits, industrial licenses…etc.). The 
investor will only need to get the machines and immediately start operating.  
An interviewed Land allocation specialist that worked on this project highlighted: 
“IDA is in collaborated with the Engineering Authority affiliated to the Armed Forces to 
make this initiative. We facilitate for the investor everything, investors only pay 25% of the 
cost of the complex and the rest is on installments. They pay EGP 10000 (non-refundable) 
for the ToRs and 5% of the total value of the factory as a part of the registration fees, these 
payments are done through IDA. They submit a feasibility study of the project along with 
paying 5% of the total factory value as an insurance payment. We made all the 
arrangements of the land allocation with NUCA, the land now is under the sovereignty of 
IDA. These initiatives are targeted for in three sectors: pharmaceutical, food and 
manufacturing industries sectors” (Land Allocation Specialist 2, IDA, December 2016)  
                                                          
9  IDA took the land from NUCA and tendered it to the public with a “plan” of SMEs complexes. These 
complexes/factories are not yet build, they are just a plan that IDA made it collectively with Engineering Authority of 
the Armed Forces. Then IDA made a tendering process, investors who are selected pay 25% of the total cost of the 
factory as a down payment. After these complexities are fully sold out, IDA begins in building those factories. 
Investors continue paying the installments. They should receive the factories built and licensed after 1 year form 
paying the down payment (Land Allocation Specialist 2, December, 2016).  
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This is an interesting initiative that is purely targeting SMEs since it facilitates the 
establishment and operation process for them. Time and efforts are also saved with regards to 
construction and licensing10. Investors are just required to pay IDA the cost of these services. 
This initiative is considered a typical vertical type of an industrial policy since it is encouraging 
the growth of the three targeted sectors - the pharmaceutical, food and manufacturing industries 
sectors- that were previously identified as top promising sectors for SMEs operations in Egypt. 
The initiative provides specific incentives to investors in the three specific sectors. However, 
as mentioned by Rogersson (2001), such type of industrial policy that has to be implemented 
carefully and with clear criteria in order to make sure that they are attracting correct target 
groups. In other words, the government has to make sure that these complexes are attractive 
enough to attract the right potential investors that will utilize the received benefits and 
incentives.  
SMEs weak response to the initiative: In order to really understand the IDA strategy in 
conducting a plan that best utilizes the land and makes it attractive for SME investors, we asked 
the officials working on “Your Licensed Factory is Ready: SMEs” Initiatives on the size of 
demand on these projects. The number of demanded applications or ToRs is the main indicator 
of the attractiveness and the demand size of this project. As per an interviewed land allocation 
specialist, Merghem in Alexandria is the most successful example and the one that witnessed 
the highst demand.  
                                                          
10  IDA provides only the initial approvals need to start the operation.   
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“Merghem is the most successful example, but it was not fully occupied form the first tender, 
we tendered it in 2016 and we needed to repeat the tender again in 2017 to sell the rest of the 
complexes” (Land Allocation Specialist 2, December, 2016) 
The interviewee highlighted that the demand on the project complexes is not yet at its maximum 
which required re-tendering again. This could be attributed to several reasons: first, the selected 
targeted industries might not be attractive enough for investors; second, the longstanding mistrust 
between investors and the government, which is amplified with the fact that these complexes are 
tendered on study with no real constructions yet; and most importantly, the reluctance of the 
investors to risk the tender and insurance fees (pay the initial EGP10,000 in addition to the 
insurance fees) in case they did not win.  
Another statement that was said by IDA representative at Qena, where a complex of this project 
was also tendered pointed out:  
“The IDA allocated a large area in an industrial zone at Qena under the “Your Factory Ready 
with its license: SMEs” initiative SMEs complexes, the complexes ranged  144 meters, 
297meters and 3027 meters. The price of the smallest possible complex (144 meters) is 
EGP525000, they pay 25% of the price in the beginning and then the rest is on installments. 
Only 2 people bought the ToRs while we have a capacity of 40 factories.(IDA Representative, 
Qena, November, 2016)   
IDA representative indicated that the turnout on the Ready Build Factories is extremely low; only 
around 5% of the complexes were tendered. He gave us a quick glimpse on the sizes of the 
proposed factories and their prices. The data that he provided shows that the investor has to pay at 
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least EGP131, 250 (which is the 25% of the smallest complex, the 144 meters that its total cost is 
525000). This might be a reason behind the low demand in this area in particular.  
The IDA Initiative: "Your Licensed Factory is Ready: SMEs Initiative" – Investor  Perspective 
Investors perceive the initiative differently. Although investors affirmed that the reasons behind the 
low demand on the SME complexes in Qena might be different than those in Merghem and 
Alexandria. While Merghem is now nearly fully-occupied, the case is different in Qena complexes. 
Investment in Qena is generally less attractive because of the geographical distance barrier. Qena 
is too far from Cairo where most of the industrial services are located as well as IDA main branch. 
The previously-determined sizes of these complexes might not be suitable to the needs of all 
investors. Also, investors argue that these complexes are expensive. An interviewed investor from 
Nagaa Hamadi (affiliate to Qena governorate) was asked about his opinion on this initiative he said 
the following: 
“Why would I go and buy something that is not there, I am paying my money in a project 
that is not done yet, what makes me sure that the government will not take this money and 
give me a bad built complex? The land in Upper Egypt is for free, why will I pay this in the 
beginning of my project, while I can take the land for free and build according to my 
needs… Also how Nagaa Hamadi is a place that expels citizens, how do they expect people 
to come and invest here. Adding to that, do you think a small investor will be interested to 
buy a factory that is 144 square meters, 144 meters are not small factories.” (Investor 5, 
November, 2016) 
The investor affirmed the previously mentioned disadvantages of initiative. He discussed what he 
believes to be reasons for the unattractiveness of this land to him, and why he believes that this 
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project at Nagaa Hamady, Qena will fail. He primarily noted the uncertainty related to the process 
of investing money in a factory that is not built yet. This is added to the rigidity of the factory 
designs and plans which might not fit small investors and as well might be beyond their needs and 
resources.  
The operation of firms under the IDA initiative: In order to explore the operation of the firms that 
won the tenders, winning investors in Merghem, Alexandria were asked about their overall process 
experience. As per the interviewees, although the capacity of tendered Merghem complexes is 90 
factories, only 12 of them are currently working. Eleven factories of the total 12 were previously 
informal firms, while just one firm is a totally new investment. An investor was asked about his 
experience and he highlighted the following:  
“I first bought the ToR, they first said that it is will cost EGP500..then I knew that I have 
to pay another EGP2000 for the application. I submitted the feasibility study and  they 
recommended that IDA does it, I paid EGP2000 for it. I paid 25% of IDA and the bank will 
pay the rest for me and I will pay back to the bank. The myth of a ready based factory with 
its license is not true! Number 1, They only built 60% of the buildings and I was urged to 
pay EGP140000 to complete the rest of the building. Number 2, the myth of the 
licensing…they only give us a temporary permit and then we have to go through the whole 
process buy ourselves to get the permanent license, and renew our licenses each 
year.”(Investor 9, December, 2017)   
As can be inferred from the investor’s words, the project is argued to be not satisfying the 
needs of the investor. The limited number of operating factories indicates that there are underlying 
difficulties in the design framework of the project. Examples of the mentioned problems are the 
misinformation presented to investors. For example, investors were informed that IDA undertakes 
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the full licensing process, while in reality IDA just offered them a temporary permit. Also, 
investors claimed that the established factories were either incomplete (where the investor had to 
finish the buildings and constructions on his own) or do not fit the nature of his investments. In 
both cases, investors had to make additions to the buildings and constructions of the factory to 
start their operations.    
Another investor was asked about his experience and the problems he is facing and which 
phase is he in now he indicated the following:  
“I have a problem with the electricity  I need a capacity of 2500 Kilo while they just provide 
me with 90 Kilo Watt and I should pay EGP 800 for each extra kilo watt, now I need to pay 
400000 for electricity and 700000 for the bank as the 25% to start working in the factory, 
how can I pay all this while I am considered a small investor. Also Merghem was originally 
designed for foundries - ferrous metal, but it did not succeed, thus the electricity and the 
buildings had other features that are not compatible with the needs of the plastic industry. 
Additionally, the buildings are not well built, come and see when it rains what happens. 
The factories who are working are the factories that  were previously operating informally, 
they are doing fine because they are capable of coping with the costs needed since they 
already make profits” (Investor 10, December, 2017)  
 A similar kind of problems is highlighted by this investor. He claims that the offered 
electricity is insufficient compared to his needs and that any extra Kilo Watt is expensive for him 
to afford. Also, he claims that the 25% of the down payment constitutes a real burden. Adding to 
that, he affirms the previously mentioned problem; that the design of the complexes does not fit 
the specific characteristics of his industry, since it was originally designed to fit another industry. 
Finally, he pointed out that the complexes were not well built. But on the other hand, despite these 
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shortcomings, it can be said that this initiative helped the inclusion of part of the informal plastic 
factories in the formal economy, which can be considered a great gain. 
To conclude, SMEs complexes designed by IDA for the purpose of facilitating investment to SMEs 
can be considered a good initiative, however IDA has not yet fully utilized the potential gains from 
this initiative. IDA need to attract more investors and sustain the outcomes of the initiative. Serious 
measure need to be implemented to overcome the mentioned shortcomings.  Matching the supply 
with the demands and needs of the investors is a crucial action that needs more efforts. In the 
discussion section, the shortcomings of land allocation and needed actions will be discussed more 
thoroughly.  
4.1.4 To what extent does the current land allocation framework in Egypt support SMEs 
access to land: Discussion  
The above desk review data analysis imply that land allocation for industrial sector in Egypt, 
particularly in the case of SMEs, despite the recent reforms, still suffers from some major problems 
that hinders the effective operation of industrial activities; particularly SMEs. The top problems 
will be summarized in the following points.   
A) High fragmentation of the legal and institutional framework 
As shown above the industrial land in Egypt suffers from a highly fragmented legal and 
institutional framework which is one of the reasons behind the SMEs problem in access to land. 
Figure (6) summarizes all the laws and decrees governing industrial sector land allocation and 
administration activities.  
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  Figure (6): Legal framework of Industrial Land Allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author Constructed 
 As shown in the figure above, the industrial land of Egypt is divided upon different 
authorities through different types of regulations. Since 2006, IDA was granted the authority to 
allocate land regardless which authority is sovereign over this land. This resulted in the unification 
of the industrial land allocation, however, this created another problem which is the differentiation 
between the agency allocating and the agency transferring the land. The investor had to deal with 
at least two agencies IDA and the agency that has sovereignty over the land, which resulted in 
operational problems in the land allocation and transfer processes. However, the lack of 
information about the current legal institutional framework governing the process of land 
allocation is still perceived a major barriers for industrial activities; particularly SMEs. 
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B) Law 83 of 2016 as step forward to solving access to land problems.  
 Law 83 of 2016 was issued to solve the problem of the inconsistence of agencies between 
the land allocation and the land transfer in which it gave IDA the sovereignty over the industrial 
land that it allocates. Also, this law mentioned that IDA will just manage the land, not own it which 
shows that the Egyptian government is not viewing the land as an asset. As Kaganova (2017) 
mentioned, this is one of the criteria of the effective land allocation system, which stresses on the 
importance of defining land as an input that the government manages and owned by the people.  
However, this reform might not be in full consistency with article no. 176 of the constitution for 
economic decentralization which holds for the transfer of economic assets to governorates. 
Conjointly, for this reform to work it needs 1)  cooperation between authorities that own lands like 
NUCA and Governorates in order to facilitate the transfer of this land, as Rodrick (2014) 
mentioned that institutional coherence smoothens the implementation of ; 2) IDA should ensure 
the availability of the  adequate funds and human resources that could handle the responsibility of 
these lands, which was confirmed by Kollavelli (2011) that human resources integration is 
significant factor in policy reforms. As Kaganova (2017) indicated, unifying the land allocation 
framework is an essential industrial policy that should support overcoming the access to land 
barrier.  This institutional reform targeted by IDA will decrease the bureaucratic space as argued 
Loewe (2013).  
C) Overlapping responsibilities between GAFI and IDA 
 Another confusing issue is the law no.15 of 2015 which mandates GAFI to be the agent 
between the investor and the other authorities and that it is responsible for providing the licenses 
and permits for the investor. This is very confusing for investors since they do not whether to 
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approach GAFI or IDA whenever they would like to start an industrial business. This could be 
regarded as a challenge to an effective implementation of an effective industrial policy as per 
Rodrick (2014) framework. Institutional arrangement can either hinder or facilitate an effective 
implementation of an industrial policy.  
D) Increased duties and responsibilities of IDA and its human resources capabilities 
 As noted earlier in the study, Kollavalli et. Al, (2011) and Rodrick, (2004) affirmed 
that adequate human resources and capabilities are essential for institutions in implementing the 
industrial policy. Data analysis showed that there might be insufficient human resources and this 
could turn the potential opportunities of policy interventions into potential threats. Failure to 
support the investor with needed information and responses to his needs and requirements will 
result in a wider gap between the investor’s needs and the policy implementation.  
Another manifestation of the need to strengthen the human resources at IDA, is that IDA is now 
responsible for creating the “strategy of Industrial land Utilization” this requires human resources 
capacities that undertake an effective data collection and planning for the this strategy to ensure a 
correct implementation of this strategy.  
E) Geographical coverage of IDA and outreach to investors 
As confirmed in Wang (2012), efficient geographical coverage is a key success factor of the 
industrial policy interventions. However, as indicated by the desk analysis and affirmed by the 
interviewed sample of investors and officials, IDA geographical coverage demonstrates  high 
centralization and poor coordination with local authorities which is a persistent barrier to industrial 
investors, particularly small and medium investors which already suffer from transport barriers in 
much more than large industrial firms.  
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 Coordination between the industrial policy institution and the implementing institutional 
bodies and coherence in the bureaucratic space were proven to be a necessity to ensure the effective 
implementation of land allocation policy (Loewe, 2013; UNIDO, 2013). Despite this fact, until 
today, IDA on the central level didn’t yet establish strong and efficient coordination mechanisms 
with local authorities and other institutions that acquire information and resources on the process 
of land allocation.  
F) Information provided for investors about new legislations and current relevant    
authorities  
Information is essential for the success of any industrial policy. Information can have a positive 
outcome of industrial policy interventions since it can create information externalities and help 
investors in their operations (Galal ,2008;  Pack & Saggie , 2006; Taha 2007). However, industrial 
investors in Egypt suffer primarily from an information problem. Investors do not have accurate 
information on the functions of the relevant agencies, needed documents, recent changes in laws 
and procedures. Despite the recent reforms, access to information problem is still a major barrier 
with regards to land allocation institutional and operational framework.  
G) Supply based policy in provision of land  
Lin (2012) differentiated between the supply and the demand driven industrial policy, a supply-
driven demand policy when the policy is designed based on the economy’s available resources. 
This is highly manifested in the initiative of “Your licensed Factory is Ready: SME initiative" 
which showed very low demand from investors in areas like Upper Egypt. This initiative in Upper 
Egypt shows that it was not planned in a way that reflected the needs of the investors in this 
geographic location. Even the initiatives that had higher demands, is not done in accordance to the 
real needs of the investors and a manifestation of this is at “Merghem Complex”. As per Lin, a 
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supply based policy might fail in case it was not done based on extensive studies. Also data 
collected on SMEs complex initiative shows that IDA has not yet succeeded in creating an 
attractive and strategy that is effectively utilized.  
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4.2 Business licensing Problem in Egypt-Data Analysis and Findings 
This section will analyze the process of the industrial licensing based on the issuance of the 
law no. 15 of 2017 that is concerned with Industrial licensing facilitation. A comparative analysis 
is undergone between the licensing process before the issuance of the new licensing law and what 
has to be done according to the law.   The analysis is mainly based on investors' opinions on 
licensing problems as well as the problems from the perspective of government officials and 
experts.  
The analysis aims to observe to what extent the new licensing law should contribute to solving 
the old persistent problems and as well to find out to what extent the law is being implemented 
which eventually affects the e remaining problems and suggested measures will then be presented 
in the discussion section.  
4.2.1 Business Licensing Process Prior to Law no. 15 of 2017 
Previously, industrial licensing procedure used to take an average of 1-2 years and in some cases 
more than that. This section will present a review on this process prior to the enactment of law no. 
15 of 2017. The analysis is based on desk review, interview with a management representative in 
IDA licensing department in addition to a legal consultant at ERRADA. Primarily, the old process 
of business licensing required investors to go through six main steps: 1) Land allocation, 2) 
Business Registry and Commercial registry, 3) Industrial Registry, 4) Preliminary Approval, 5) 
Construction permit and 6) Final approval Industrial licensing granted. These steps might not have 
always moved in order, but, for example sometimes, there were steps that proceeded others.  
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Step 1:Land Allocation: IDA allocates land for tenders (either specific or general tender)11 where 
investors submits all the required documents and the feasibility study of the project. After land is 
allocated to the investor, IDA gives him a time limit of 36 months to start operations on this land. 
In case the 36 months passed and the investor did not start operations, he/she will be subject to 
land withdrawal. These 36 months limit is divided into three phases: one month for the land 
transfer process; then a maximum of six months to obtain the construction permit; afterwards, 
maximum 12 months to put the building foundations; then maximum of 18 months for finalizing 
the buildings and IDA go and preview the site12. The investor has finalize the land allocation 
process, in parallel with the previous steps.  
Step2: Applying for a commercial registry, which requires the basic documents for the registration 
of the company. The Commercial Registry was previously under the authority of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry and now it is under the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade. It has branches 
in all governorates and a representation at GAFI OSS.  
Investors seeking commercial registration have two options: The first option is to register through 
GAFI OSS. This takes place in case that the company is under The Companies law number 159 
for year 1981 or under the Investment law number 72 for year 2017. In this case, the investor can 
register through GAFI directly after the establishment procedures are finalized. The second option 
is when the investor registers through the commercial registry branch in the relevant governorate. 
In this case, the investor is intending to register the company under the trade law number 17 to 
year 1991 (Legal Expert, ERRADA, November, 2016). 
                                                          
11 Difference between general and specific tender were explained earlier in the chapter. 
12 Since IDA is only mandated to allocate the land, the investor receives the land from the Authority that manages the 
land and the land is under its sovereignty. 
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Step 3:Applying for an Industrial registry. This requires (a) filling the application form as per 
presidential decree no.350 of 2005; (b) the company commercial registry; (c) company tax card; 
(d) indicating the registration with the Social Insurance Authority for employees and (d) the 
certificate indicating the registration in the Federation of Industries.  
Upon the submission and approval of the application, a temporary certificate is issued by IDA. 
The file should then be transferred to the relevant technical department within one year. Technical 
inspection of the factory shall take place within one year from the issuance of the temporary 
certificate. The Technical Opinion is set up for preview. The file shall be transferred to the 
Industrial Registry Department for the issuance of the permanent industrial register and the 
delivery of the certificate to the client (IDA Internal Documents, 2017). 
Step 4: Applying for the preliminary approval. Here, the investor goes to IDA and applies for the 
initial permit as per ministerial decree no.825 of 2008. This approval requires (a) Commercial 
registry; (b) all documents related to the initial "company registration”; (c) certificates of non-
compliance. This step mainly entails that the IDA is approving the idea of the industrial project of 
the investor.  
Step 5: Applying for the construction permit. Law no.119 of 2008 granted the right of providing 
construction permits of any industrial building to the agency responsible for reviewing the 
industrial activities, which is IDA according to the presidential decree no. 350 of 2005. Although, 
IDA became the agency that grants the construction permits of any industrial building, however, 
law no. 119 also states that the granting construction permits should be through technical 
engineering offices to be accredited from the IDA. IDA or any other agency just approves the 
construction permits after the process is done at these accredited offices. What really happens is 
that investors submit the needed documents and the drawings of the building, after approving it by 
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IDA specialists, sites are inspected through a field visit after the undertaking all the construction 
in order to approve the buildings.  
Step 6: Applying for the final approval -Industrial License. Law no. 21 of 1958 for organizing 
Industries which is a key law in the governance of the industrial sector.  This law regulates the role 
of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in defining specifications and standards and encouraging 
industrial activities. This law and its executive regulations specified that the investor has to get the 
document proving: commercial registry, initial approval for undertaking the industrial activity, 
industrial registry, land allocation and the construction permit. After obtaining the documents 
proving that these approvals are completed, the investor starts obtaining the external entities 
approvals on his activity as a requirement for taking the final approval of the commencement of 
the activity. This step is called “Regulating the conditions with external parties”. In this step each 
industrial activity has to regulate its conditions with some external entities based on the nature of 
each industrial activity. These agencies are: 1) Civil protection- Interior Defense; 2) Environment- 
Ministry of Environment; 3) Ministry of Health; 4) Interior Cameras-Ministry of Interior; 5) 
Industrial Protection and 6) Industrial Drainage. In practice, this is the step that used to take the 
longest time in the process of business licensing. The investor has to meet the conditions of at least 
six external agencies, these agencies are those who are essential for most of industrial activities.  
Civil protection - Interior Defense: Law 148 of 1959 on Civil Security regulates the civil defense 
issue. It specifies that the Civil Defense Authority assesses industrial buildings and establishments 
and issue their approval to start any industrial activity.  Article 3 and Article 6 of the law state that 
the Civil Defense Agency has to put the technical and preventative conditions for any industrial 
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establishment13. In addition to that, Civil Defense representatives have to visit the establishment 
and make sure that their requirements are met.  This procedure is the most time-consuming 
procedure that alone might take around two years.  
 Industrial Protection Institution: law no.991 of 1976 that regulates conditions related to the 
industrial safety. It controls the conditions related to the essential safety conditions for any 
industrial activity. Usually industrial protection procedures cannot start before the finalization of 
the conditions of the civil protection.  
The Ministry of Environment: as per law no. 4 of 1994 on Environmental issues which identifies 
the environmental conditions and precautions with commercial activities. This law articulates the 
conditions for approving an industrial project from an environmental perspective.  It specifies that 
all industrial facilities have to have an environmental impact evaluation regardless the type of the 
industry. It also stipulates that similar industrial activities have to be located in areas close to each 
other, this step takes place with the land allocation step. However, it has to be resubmitted together 
with the latest manifestation of the project. It might take one year or even more sometimes. It is 
costly for the investor it may cost around EGP 30,000 -50,000.  
4.2.2 Current Difficulties following the Implementation of Law no.15 of 2017- data analysis 
The new law changed the entire licensing system. Although, the law is not yet into full action, 
however, it is necessary to discuss whether the main reforms included in the law will overcome 
                                                          
13 Civil Defense Agency is mandated to take the appropriate measures to deal with disasters, hazards and minimize 
their effects. They are also responsible for directing  and implementing the measures of fire and rescue operations, 
organizing the means of warning and the necessary precautionary ways to avoid or limit the dangers of unexpected 
events. 
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the previously mentioned licensing problem challenges. This is in addition to exploring the main 
claimed problems/ weaknesses as per the interviewed sample.    
The new law effectuates a new 'notification license system' that classifies industrial projects 
under two categories: High risk industries and low risk industries. Article two of the law indicates 
that, for low-risk industries, IDA grants investors the license prior to finalizing the documents and 
undertaking the needed inspection. On the other hand, for the high risk industries, the investor has 
to finalize the entire needed documents and inspection has to be fully finalized before the licensing 
issuance. It is not permissible that the industrial activity starts before finalizing all the required 
procedures. A list of 45 high risk industries is provided in the executive regulations of the law. In 
the next table, the main changes that took place in the current law will be presented as opposed to 
the old process.  The following table demonstrates the main reform measures introduced in the 
new law compared to the old process prior to the enactment of the law.   
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Table (6): Business licensing process according to law no. 15 of 2017 compared to the old process 
 Business Licensing process Prior to Law no. 
15/2017 
Business Licensing process according to Law no. 15/2017 
1) Land Allocation 
 2) Commercial registration 
 3) Industrial registry 
- Same process  - Same process 
Notification Licensing 
System and preliminary 
approvals 
 Preliminary approvals used to be granted 
until the other licensing documents are 
finalized.  
 The new law cancelled the preliminary approval that the IDA 
used to grant investors until the investor finishes his/her 
studys.   
 
Time framework 
 There weren’t specific time frameworks 
designed for each step according to the old 
process, however, some IDA information 
indicate that the whole process after getting 
the industrial registry usually takes around 
360. 
 Investor submits the administrative documents with regards 
to his industrial activity and takes the temporary license 
within one week. 
 The investor is given three months till the he submits the 
technical documents for the project.  
 During those three months, a technical team form IDA should 
make a field inspection and give a feedback within 90 days. 
 If IDA finds that the industrial establishment is violating the 
prescribed requirements, it grants the investor a period not 
exceeding 180 days to improve his/her conditions. For the 
medium enterprises, this time limit is doubled.  
 IDA is authorized to close the establishment  in case that the 
investor cannot comply and cannot “regulate his condition 
with the external entities” 
Distinguishing between low 
risk and high risk industries 
 Non- existent in the law 
The law distinguishes between high-risk and low-risk industries: 
- Low-risk industries undergo the normal process and steps 
- For high risk industries, the investor has to finalize all 
administrative and technical documents before being granted 
the industrial license.   
Regulating  conditions  
 All industries have to regulate their 
conditions after obtaining  the 
preliminary approvals 
- For low risk industries, regulating conditions is required 
after issuing the license  
- For high rick The investor has to regulate all his 
conditions with the external entities like the civil 
defense, environment and health before he applies for 
the license.   
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 Business Licensing process Prior to Law no. 
15/2017 
Business Licensing process according to Law no. 15/2017 
The establishment of the 
“Accreditation Offices” 
- Did not exit 
- Article 17 specifies that there will be offices accredited by 
IDA and will be mandated to undertake the examination of 
the investor’s documents, and they will be responsible for 
determining the extent to which the documents meet the 
necessary requirements.  
- IDA shall issue a license to the accreditation offices that have 
the necessary expertise to practice this activity in accordance 
with the conditions, rules and procedures issued by a decision 
of the Prime Minister. 
Construction Permits - Law 119 of 2008 stipulated that IDA has to 
delegate the assignment of the construction 
permits to technical engineering offices to 
check the regulations and make the needed 
inspection, and IDA should not go through 
this whole process. 
  
- The law wasn't enforced previously, however, according to 
IDA officials; there is a plan to start enforcing the law. Yet, 
the research couldn’t obtain information about the institution 
that will be in charge of issuing construction permits.  
Coordination among external 
entities 
-Each industrial activity had to regulate the 
conditions with at least six entities which is the 
longest step in the process  
- Article 15 stipulates that the a committee has to be formed 
under the chairmanship of IDA that includes representatives 
form Federation of Industries and external entities.  
- The committee is required to design a set of unified required 
conditions on industrial activities. For example, the 
environment and civil defense. This committee shall review 
the requirements and conditions of obtaining the industrial 
license in order to facilitate the procedures “regulating the 
condition with external entities”.  
- IDA based on this assessment shall provide this service on 
behalf of these external entities.   
  -  
 
Source: Author Constructed
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4.2.3 Longstanding Problems of business licensing, recent reforms and remaining issues – 
data analysis 
In this section, the results of the discussions with the sample interviewees will be presented. The 
analysis is classified into two sections: first, the exploration of the licensing problems prior to the 
issuance of law no. 15/2017. Second, the remaining problems that still occur after the 
implementation of the law.  
A. Longstanding Problems of business licensing prior to law no.15/2017 
This section will give an overview on the main problems with the industrial licensing 
process prior to the new law no. 15 of 2017 enacted to facilitate the industrial licensing process.  
Procedural steps are too long and expensive for SMEs. An important requirement for the 
industrial licensing and its renewal is the industrial registry. The industrial registry's renewal or 
application requires different documents. An investor that was interviewed at IDA branch in Sohag 
Governorate stated that:  
“I cannot get my new license from the IDA since I have to get a new registration from 
the Federation of Industries which is located in Cairo. I am sick to travel and I have a very 
small activity; the expenses of the trip are too much for me. Why shall I go to Cairo to make 
this? in addition to the cost of the registration itself” (Investor 6, December, 2017). 
The investor highlighted the trouble faced when he has to issue a temporary license; he says 
that he has to issue the commercial registry which requires a document form the Federation of 
Industries which is located in Cairo. The investor has to go to Cairo to issue this study which is 
expensive for him. The investor has a small industrial activity that is not very profitable, and there 
is no support from the local IDA branch at Sohag. This shows that the investor is having a real 
trouble with the expenses and the effort that he has to make in order to get one document that is 
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needed for a step out of six steps of the licensing process. We can also infer form this that there is 
low coordination between the central and the local authorities, an investor at Sohag has to go to 
Cairo to get issue a document (Federation of Industries membership).  
Talking about the industrial registry, we have to mention that in an interview with a licensing 
expert at IDA indicated that: 
“The industrial registry is another burdening step for the investor. The industrial 
registry shall only be like an identification card for the industrial establishment, 
having to renew it and is needed as a requirement for the licensing. The investor can 
make an industrial registry and submits it for the preliminary approval and till he 
reaches the final approval this registry gets expired and therefore he has to renew it” 
(Licensing Expert, IDA, December, 2016)  
The expert says that the industrial register is an additional step that burdens the investor and 
is considered like a red tape to that requires effort and time. He even points out to that an investor 
that is applying for an industrial license is required might need to make and industrial registry and 
renew it more than once since it the whole licensing process might take two years or even more. 
Vague distinction criteria between industrial activity license and “operating license14”. Some 
interviewees highlighted that there is confusion between activities classified under the operational 
license and the ones that require an industrial license; which requires a much more complicated 
process. The licensing Expert at IDA indicated that:  
                                                          
14 Operating license: licenses given to activities like running shops. These licenses do not require any industrial 
activity. (Licensing Expert, 2016) 
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“There is a thin line between what is operational and what is industrial, for example, some 
bakery shops are considered industrial while they do not require real industrial activity. The 
investor goes to apply in the local authority where they produce the operating license then if they 
see a certain machine in his feasibility study they tell him he has to go to IDA to make an 
industrial license, while this is due to ignorance of the function of that machine.” (Licensing 
Expert, IDA, 2017) 
The expert here highlights that sometimes there is confusion about the classification of the 
projects under industrial sector as opposed to other operations.  He attributes this to the insufficient 
knowledge of some employees that are entitled with the application process.  
This argument was supported by another investor who had a small factory for liquid soap 
packaging, the investor stated: 
“I am lost between the IDA and the local agency, I have a small establishment that packs 
liquid soap, this does not entail any industrial activity, however, I was told by the local authority 
at the governorate that this is an industrial activity and that I have to get an industrial license 
and I am now at IDA trying to finish my documents and they tell me that this is not industrial, go 
back to the local office” (Investor 8, 2017)  
The investor confirmed the previous argument that some activities are not clear whether they 
require an industrial licensing or just an operating license. He says that he just operates a packaging 
activity and therefore it does not require any industrial or manufacturing production. However, the 
investor was requested to issue an industrial license from IDA. When he went to IDA he was told 
that this is not an industrial activity.  
Time and cost – sometimes corruption in the process of regulating conditions with external 
entities: It is strongly argued that procedures related to “regulating the conditions with external 
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authorities” where the investor has to coordinate with other agencies like civil protection, 
environment and health and comply to their conditions are of the biggest obstacles facing investors 
and is the most time consuming step.  This argument is supported by interviews with IDA 
management officials on one side and by investor on the other side. Interviewed IDA official 
confirmed:  
“Regulating the conditions of the investor with the external entities is the most tiring and 
hectic process in all the licensing process. It takes tremendous efforts and time form the investor 
and he might stay for years because of this. The conditions of these entities are very important 
for the protection of the general safety, for example, the civil protection that puts the conditions 
against hazards and fire is so important. But the problem comes in the application of this. For 
example, the civil defense takes around two year and maybe more. It is a normal governmental 
agency that has positives and negatives and there are sometimes people who take bribes. Also, 
another problem that usually shows in the civil defense is that the police officers who preview 
the site and confirm the establishment’s setting with the conditions usually change every six 
months, and when they change they start the process form the beginning.” (Industrial licensing 
Management Representative, December, 2016).  
The interviewee confirms that although regulating the condition of the industrial 
establishment with the external entities is one of the most complicated steps; yet, it is crucial for 
the safety of these establishments and for the public as well. Nevertheless, the process entails some 
problems: First, the time and efforts consumed in this process. Second, sometimes investors are 
urged to pay bribes to complete their work. Finally, operational problem that can be considered 
one of the reasons of the prolonged time of this process is the high turnover rate of officers 
responsible for undertaking the site inspection (they usually change every six months. The process 
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is not sustainable and highly linked to individual officers behaviors. (Management Representative, 
Licensing department, IDA, December 2017)  
The interviewee also gave another example related to environmental conditions: 
“The investor has to submit a study with the environmental impact assessment in the 
step of the land allocation since some industries cannot be located in certain areas. And 
resubmitted again in the licensing process (after the land is allocated) the new study 
should be tailored to the land allocated for the activity. Each study could take between 
EGP 30,000 and 50,000 and sometimes the investor could not take the approval except 
after a strong recommendation” (Management Representative, Licensing department, 
IDA, December 2017). 
The interviewee argues that the investor has to submit the environmental document twice 
despite the fact that it is very expensive. Also she stresses again on the role of personal relations 
and that the issuance of such documents might be corrupted and subject to personal relations.  
On the other hand, an interviewed investor stresses on this point: 
“Even of the government facilitates all the procedures the external agencies will remain a 
problem, or problem in licensing is not with IDA, the real problem is with the external agencies 
that take time and money and many of the representatives there do not understand the nature of 
our factories, in my factory I paid EGP 111000 for the civil protection and it took me two years to 
get their approval” (investor 3, December, 2017) 
The investor here underscores the previous argument; that is, regulating the conditions with 
the external entities is a very costly and time consuming step. Any reform action that doesn’t tackle 
this problem will be incomplete.  
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B. Current problems with the implementation of law no.15 of 2017- Government 
Perspective 
In spite of the tangible reforms designed in the new law, a closer look on the implementation 
of the law shows that the law is not into full action yet. This section presents an analysis of the 
current status of the process at IDA following the implementation of law no.15/2017, based on 
interviews with an IDA management representative at licensing department, IDA licensing expert 
and Research Analyst at ERRADA.  
In light of an interview with a leader at the licensing department at IDA, when asked about the 
current licensing process at IDA she confirmed that:   
“Prior to licensing, the investor get the so called: “temporary licensing for one year” this 
temporary licensing is based on the submission of the 1) commercial registry; 2) Industrial 
registry 3) the land allocation letter. After revising these documents, the investor applies 
for the licensing (either notification or primary).” (Industrial Licensing Leader, IDA, 
December, 2016) 
Although preliminary approvals were cancelled in the new law, however, an added step replaced 
– called temporary approval- the preliminary approval step. Apparently, the procedure is still there 
but it is just about changing the names.  Hence the final impact on the licensing process is "no 
change". 
Also, ERRADA Research Analyst who is doing public consultation son the new law stated the 
following:  
“This law is facing a problem in implementation, on Mid-December IDA signed a protocol 
the Civil Defense that entailed that the civil defense will be continue to put its conditions 
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for industrial licensing and will have to follow up on this” (Research Analyst, ERRADA, 
December 2017) 
The interviewee says that Civil Protection Agency is one of the important agencies that the 
investor has to regulate the conditions with external agencies. It is argued to be the one that takes 
most of the time and continues to impose its conditions on the investor in a discouraging manner. 
This contradicts with the law that specifies that IDA should take the full responsibility of this 
issue on behalf of the investor.  
When the Analyst was asked about the progress of the new law and about the number of licenses 
issued since the issuance of the executive regulations, she stated: 
“As for the high-risk industries (Prior Notification) it is just one license that is not even 
finalized, and for the low risk industries, very little licenses were issued, and mainly to 
(Merghem complex) the SME complex established in Alexandria for plastic industries. 
Investors there took the license, but the problem is that these complexes are not ready yet 
and the required conditions for licensing are not fully met. For example, buildings are not 
fully accomplished, electricity still not fully connected, so in my opinion, the licensing is 
facilitated as per the interest of IDA” (Research Analyst, ERRDADA, December, 2016). 
The interviewed analyst argued that there is nearly no licenses issued under the “prior licensing” 
system. And even under the notification system, the issued licenses are very limited. The 
interviewee claims that the issued license most of them were given to those complexes at 
“Merghem” where the government established a complex for SMEs under the initiative “your 
licensed factory is ready”.  IDA tenders SMEs complexes that look to be ready for production and 
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license shall be attained. The interviewee argues that IDA might be subjective in the selection of 
the projects.  
C. Current problems with the implementation of law no.15 of 2017- Investors and Experts 
Perspective 
This section will present the investors’ views on the latest reforms with regards to the new 
licensing process that was implemented after the issuance of the new licensing law and its 
executive regulations. 
 The full implementation of the law and its executive regulations took- place in August 2017, 
hence, it is too early to measure any impact of the law. However, the researcher attempted to 
analyze the relevance of the newly adopted law to SMEs problems from two different perspectives: 
SMEs investors that recently applied for industrial licensing or are in the process of receiving it; 
and the perspective of IDA consultants for industrial licensing and process mapping.  
Time reduction: Some investors were asked about their experience with the new industrial 
licensing process at IDA. Most investors indicated that the new notification system saved a lot of 
time and effort that were wasted before the real start of operations. An investor that tried the 
licensing process before the reform indicated that: 
“The licensing process now is much better because of the time it saved, we used to go to 
multiple agencies which was really hectic, and we have to consider anyone took a license 
before this law as a warrior, it used to take us ages.” (Investor 16, November, 2016) 
The investor pointed out that the new law is expected to facilitate the process and decrease the 
time taken to start production. He stressed that the investors were usually overwhelmed with 
seeking several approvals before the commencement of activities and this was time and effort 
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consuming for the investors. Investors used to have hard time in obtaining the license and under 
the new system. This problem is somehow solved.    
Another investor that confirmed the same argument which entails that IDA facilitated the 
commencement of industrial activities especially by the new licensing notification system stated 
that:  
“I just received the temporary license for my new factory in one working day which was a 
relatively easy process, IDA might take more money, however, it is enough that they give 
me a facilitated service, we need to start production and start exporting activities and this 
is always tied to receiving a license.” (Investor 1, November, 2017)   
The investor highlighted that the recent reform in the license simplified the commencement of his 
industrial project and enabled him to start operations and even exporting activities directly after 
he received a temporary license which was an essential prerequisite for any exporting activity. 
This is compared to the relatively longer situation in the past, where investors had to wait for 
receiving the final license in order to start any exporting activity.   
Coverage of Industrial license: A concept that was also stressed on by some investors is that the 
coverage of the Industrial Licensing is very wide. In other words, many activities involve having 
an industrial license or even having an industrial registry that is part of the industrial licensing 
process. This issue was discussed by Wang (2012), Wang confirmed that for a licensing reform, a 
licensing coverage assessment has to be undertaken to ensure that not all the industrial businesses 
need a license to legally operate. Investors were asked about that issue and some confirmed that 
there are some small workshops that are not considered industrial and does not require 
sophisticated type of machinery. Nevertheless, they still need industrial license. And for the new 
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workshops, they ask them to go to the new industrial zones which are usually far from the city as 
they need to be close to their customers.  
Lack of enough IDA staff for facilitating the process, bribes, confusion of understanding: The 
process is now facilitated; however, interviewees indicated that there are still some problems with 
the other processes that take much time that goes back to overloading of IDA staff with a lot of 
responsibilities. An investor that recently applied for a construction permit indicated that: 
“The new licensing notification system is a step forward. However, there are still problems 
with the fact that IDA is the entitled agency to provide the construction permits. The 
process there takes so long time and there is usually a problem in getting engineers to 
allocate go and visit the sites. Adding to this, we are always required to put money under 
the table to make it move faster (Investor 10, December, 2016). 
The investor raised the point that IDA human resources might be insufficient compared 
to the needs of the investors. He stressed that the new licensing system is a 
development that should have a positive impact on the investor.  However, he still sees 
that a step like the construction permits still takes time due to the lack of engineers. He 
also commented on the bribes that he has to give to some employees to facilitate his 
procedures. Another investor mentioned a counter argument in this regard: 
“The construction permits now should be much easier, now there are technical agencies 
that should do this” (Investor 5, December 2017) 
The investor claims that there is no need now to go to IDA in order to apply for a construction 
permit. Rather, the investor carries on this process in an external technical office that is accredited 
by IDA. IDA is just visited now for the submitting the permit. This shows that there is also a 
distraction in the understanding, and there is confusion in the implementation  
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“The best thing IDA has done to us is not letting us deal with the localities, our problem is 
not with the government. However, our problem is with the local authorities. Egypt is a 
good place to invest, however the problem is in the endless bureaucracy, but we hope that 
under the new law we think that licensing will be much easier, however, we are worried  
form IDA employees, they sometimes do not understand technically what should be done 
and a lot of times we ask questions that has no answers and we try to call the branch in 
Cairo but always in vain. Last year I had to go Cairo three times just to renew documents 
like the industrial registry.” (Investor 10, December, 2016) 
The investor here acknowledges the potential that the new law has in facilitating the industrial 
licensing procedures. He argues that in the past, he used to deal with the governorate and localities 
for the licensing process which was a complicated process. However, he hopes that under the new 
law the process is facilitated. He also comments on the capabilities of IDA staff and their 
knowledge about the procedures, this investor is located at Qena and therefore this shows that there 
is a local disconnection between central and local authorities.  
4.2.4 Business Licensing in Egypt and SMEs Empowerment: Discussion 
In this section, the researcher tries to reframe the results of the above analysis in the previously 
mentioned context of industrial policy and SMEs empowerment. More precisely, the researcher 
compares the results of the undergone analysis of the main reform measures to the literature review 
and conceptual framework. Results of the analysis can be categorized under the following points: 
A) The effectiveness of licensing reform process 
IDA differentiation between high-risk and low risk activities has led to simplification of 
measures for more than 80% of the industrial projects. It also should enhance the accuracy of the 
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required measures for high-risk projects since it now designates special requirements for different 
projects. (Wang,2012 and (WBG, 2010)  have affirmed that effective licensing are done to regulate 
the market, protect the public against negative externalities and to save scarce resources (Wang, 
2012; OECD, 2010 & WBG, 2010). Improving this step is expected to lead to these positive 
outcomes. 
IDA aimed at re-assessing the unjustified licenses through eliminating the preliminary 
license and coordinating with external entities on the nature of conditions and take the 
responsibility of the agent between investors and external entities. This can be considered a step 
towards efficient mapping and restructuring of the procedures that facilitates the license process 
in general. That resembles Wang (2012) framework of reforming industrial licenses.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that unjustified licenses were not deeply addressed in 
the reform. The case of industrial registry could demonstrate this case. Industrial registry is a 
necessary document for international trade requirements. It is a way to limit the industrial activities 
to engage in trade activities beyond their capacities and hence limits black market activities. 
However, the registry is essentially used to help the government in the planning process though 
giving indications on the number of registered companies and their capacities. These functions 
could be given to the industrial operating license. In this regard, industrial registry could be 
perceived as an unjustified license that could have been simply replaced by the license. According 
to Wang (2012), any license that is designed to collect information is considered an unjustified 
license. In this regard, industrial registry could be classified under unjustified licenses because its 
main aim is to register the industrial establishments and act as an Identification certificate of the 
establishment.  
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Hence this industrial registry, though important, yet it can be replaced by the license. The 
license can do the same job and hence the industrial registry requirement in this case can be 
perceived as per Wang (2012) framework an unjustified license that was not removed.  
Rodrick (2014) argued that while designing the policy, government should reflect the needs 
of the investors with regards to clarifying the requirements of the licenses and any relevant 
information. Despite the recent reforms, some issues in the industrial licensing are still vague and 
confusing and were not taken into account in this reform. For example, the analysis showed that a 
distinction between activities classified under industrial licenses versus those under operational 
license needs more understanding and have to be well communicated to officials that are in direct 
communication with the investor.  
B) The effectiveness of implementation process of licensing reform  
Based on the previous data analysis, we could infer that there is a confusion in understanding the 
latest policy reforms and a confusion in its implementation. Law no. 15 of 2017 is a good step 
forward to implement a simplified licensing system that should directly impact the inclusion of 
SMEs into the market. Nevertheless, analysis showed a confusion in understanding the reform 
measures for both the implementers and the investors. This was evident in three points;  
First, the contradiction between some law articles and signed protocols; as with the case of the 
Civil Defense Protocol signed with IDA15. This contradiction will impact both types of licensing 
(prior licensing and licensing by notification) and cumbersome the originally most-complicated 
step which is the regulations with external entities.  
                                                          
15 An interviewed Research Analyst at ERRADA indicated that IDA has recently signed a protocol with the Civil 
Defense which is the one of the most significant external entities that regulate the conditions of industrial activities 
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Second, the inconsistent understanding of the process in different relevant executive agencies 
and even among investors. For example, there is no clear unified understanding of the role of the 
planned accreditation offices that should be launched by IDA. An interviewed industrial license 
expert indicated that accreditation offices will act as IDA agents in providing license, however, 
interviewed IDA management representative indicated that it will only regulate the conditions with 
external entities. Another example of this confusion is the IDA website which has a published 
operating manual that describes process as per the new law. However, on the other hand, some links 
on the website are still presenting information related to the old process16.  In the time that the new 
law seeks to clarify and simplify any possible barriers, such confusion can be considered a serious 
barrier to information access, not just for the investors but also for the executives working on the 
policy implementation. As Koollavalli et al (2011) and Rodrick (2004) argued, access to all needed 
information and efficient understanding and implementation of policy tool are essential success 
drivers of the policy. Hence, the current policy framework is argued to be still suffering from a gap 
in this regard.   
The implementation of the policy is still bureaucratic and complicated. The licensing department 
consists of four management heads in addition to a legal consultant. Employees that work directly 
with investor are claimed to suffer from inconsistency in the understanding and the implementation 
of the process17. This example reflects the challenges discussed by Rodrick (2014) and Galal (2008) 
which indicate that the government bureaucracy and the institutional arrangements are of the 
biggest challenges to the implementation of industrial policy. A reason for the confusion in the 
understanding and the implementation of the policy is the weak institutional capacity. Kolavalli et 
                                                          
16 For example, frequently-asked questions link describes the old process (preliminary approval and final approval 
and no mentioning to the two new types of licensing (prior licensing and licensing by notification). 
17 As stated by ERRADA analyst that confirmed that since each head comes from a different background, this has 
different input to the details of the process.  
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at. (2011) confirmed that coordination between the industrial policy makers and the implementing 
institutional bodies is a necessity to ensure the effective implementation of the policy. They even 
suggested that this should be through the existence of a “development agency”. The agency might 
be the one implementing the designed industrial policy which is in this case IDA. Additionally, 
Kolavelli adds that the coherence in the bureaucratic space is an essential aspect for in the design 
of the policy
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
This study aimed at exploring the recent industrial policy efforts in relation to facilitating 
access to industrial production through simplifying land allocation and industrial licensing 
procedures. This study aimed at understanding the current frameworks of the land allocation and 
industrial licensing and exploring to what extent these frameworks and the recent reforms affected 
the empowerment of SMEs at the business start-up phase. The Egyptian Government undertook 
recent legal and institutional changes aiming at facilitating SMEs access to market and formal 
inclusion. These reforms were thoroughly studied and analyzed in relation to the evidence 
provided in the literature on the main principles of effective industrial policy. The study intended 
to answer a main question which is “To what extent are the current land allocation and business 
licensing frameworks and newly designed policies in Egypt empowering SMEs and enhancing 
their access to industrial market?” And two sub-questions, the first is “How does the current land 
allocation framework and the designed policy facilitate SMEs access to land?” and the second is 
“How does the current business licensing framework and the designed policy facilitate SMEs 
issuance of Industrial licenses?” 
The main findings of the research indicate that the Egyptian government undertook 
promising policy reforms that need to be more studied and analyzed in order to create real change 
on the ground.  The study highlighted the policy challenges with regards to industrial licensing 
and industrial land allocation. On the policy level, it was clearly observed that there are undefined 
and sometimes contradicting institutional and legal frameworks which usually leads to inefficient 
implementation of the policy and eventually affect the performance of SMEs. This is very clear in 
the contradiction between law no. 72 of 2017 on incentives and guarantees, law no. 83 of 2016 on 
state privately owned land and law no. 17 of 2017 for industrial licensing which revealed an 
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overlap in responsibilities between IDA and GAFI. Coordination within the institutional 
authorities working on these policies is low and reveals a contradicting institutional framework. 
Analysis showed that there is a poor harmonization at IDA on the central and local levels, also the 
effectuation of law 83 and the transfer of industrial land to IDA is still delayed due to the low 
cooperation with GAFI, NUCA, Ministry of trade and Investment and local governorates. 
Additionally, obstacles in full implementation of law no.17 of 2017 result from the low 
coordination between IDA and external authorities that regulate conditions of industrial activity.  
Furthermore, analysis showed that there is a confusion in the understanding and the 
implementation of the policies from the sides of the policy makers, policy implementers and 
investors. This is highly conceded in the understanding of the new licensing process and the 
procedures of land allocation. Analysis also revealed that policies undertaken are mostly supply-
based polices which might not meet the actual requirements of SMEs, a clear manifestation of this 
is the SME initiative implemented by IDA “Your license factory is ready”. Interviews showed that 
the low demand on the complexes granted under this initiative and their poor performance is for 
the reason that that these complexes does not adequately match the needs of the investors. This 
leads us to another reason behind the limited change the ground which is the low communication 
between the government and investors which results in limited awareness of the government with 
the needs of SMEs investors and a main reason for information externalities.  
Adding to that, analysis showed high level of centralization in the industrial policy 
demonstrated in the performance of IDA on the national and local levels. Centralization is not only 
seen on the operational level, however, even enactment of no.83 of 2016 contradicts with article 
no. 176 of the constitution for economic decentralization and the transfer of economic assets to 
governorates. It was also concluded that there is a lack of strong human resource capacities and a 
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communication strategy to policy implementers lead to an ineffective policy understanding and 
implementation.   
Based on the previous literature work reviewed and the analysis of the study, the researcher has 
the following policy recommendations to facilitate SMEs access to market: 
• An effective industrial policy requires strong consultation with the investors especially 
before conducting legislative changes in order to understand what are the specific needs 
and tailor the policy efforts according to those needs. IDA might conduct public 
consultation on the new licensing process and latest land allocation reform efforts with 
SMEs that recently conducted these processes. These consultations should enable tailoring 
land allocation and industrial licensing regulations and procedures to the nature of SMEs 
and the framework conditions in each region of Egypt and open the room for a more 
demand based policy. 
• Completing the policy framework by conducting a thorough legislative analysis to identify 
gaps and overlaps of the recent law with existing laws and regulations, then suggest a 
legislative reform process. This reform process might not require enactment of new laws, 
however, it might just require amendments to existing laws and their effectuations. For 
example, the Egyptian government needs to support the effectuation of law 83 of 2016 that 
authorized IDA to have sovereignty over the industrial land through stipulating a decree to 
transfer the land from other authorities, political leadership needs to support the transfer of 
the land to IDA. Another example of legislative analysis that should take place is the 
revision of the latest investment law in accordance law 83 of 2016 which gives GAFI and 
IDA similar mandates. The legislative analysis also has to include a revision of the 
industrial registry procedures that might be defined as unjustified. Also, a clear 
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identification of the difference between operational and industrial activities is a highly 
needed.  
• Conduct a thorough institutional analysis of all involved institutions in land allocation and 
industrial licensing, coming up with an institutional reform agenda suggesting changes to 
mandates, roles and capacities of involved institutions. This analysis has to take into 
account the dynamics between institutions involved and nature of their mandates. For 
example, in the licensing reforms proposed, there has to be a clear classification between 
the role of IDA in issuing the license and the role of external institutions putting the 
conditions like the civil defense, these institutions provide a technical inspection in the 
licensing process which might not be easily transferred to IDA. As per the new 
responsibilities of IDA, the institutional analysis shall include a review of the land 
management unit mandates and requirements. The management of the land after the new 
law requires to be done by an authority that is beyond the scope of a committee, or a unit 
at IDA.  
• Institutional coordination and the political support are key for the success of IDA in 
implementing its new mandates. The clear differentiation between IDA roles and GAFI 
roles should be a task to solve the problem of the overlapping responsibilities, especially 
after the latest investment law. Additionally, the effectuation of law 83 will not take place 
without an adequate political support to help in smooth transfer of the industrial land to 
IDA.  
• Ensuring the adequacy of the human capacitates at IDA that are entitled to implement the 
new industrial policy reforms is a crucial issue for the success of this reform. IDA’s 
widened scope of work and responsibilities has to be met with human capacities strengthen 
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in the coming period. Continuous trainings and seminars for IDA employees have to be 
conducted to ensure the understanding of the new policy and that proper capacity building 
is done.  
• IDA with its new responsibilities in land allocation and industrial licensing had to have 
more spread geographical coverage, IDA should have branches across all the Egyptian 
governorates that accommodate industrial zones. the Egyptian government had to create a 
strong cooperation mechanism between the central and the local levels that ensure the 
adequate autonomy to IDA representatives in the governorates. This mechanism has to 
include a recruitment system that enables IDA branches to recruit technical employees 
from the governorates. Also there should be an electronic system that automatically 
connects those branches to the central branch at Cairo.  
• Ensuring the clarity of the understanding of the new reforms and their implication from the 
sides of the policy drafters, implementers, and investors through creating a good 
communication strategy after collective consultations and understanding on all levels, 
nationally and locally. For example, after reaching in a consensus on the new licensing 
process and its requirements, this could be communicated through training sessions and 
workshops to introduce the new policies.
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